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Pregnancy, Medicaid, State Regulation, and the
Production of Unruly Bodies
Khiara M. Bridges ∗
ABSTRACT
¶1

This paper represents a concretization of thoughts generated during a year and a
half of anthropological fieldwork in the obstetrics clinic of Alpha Hospital—a large,
public hospital located on the island of Manhattan. As a condition of receipt of Medicaid
coverage of prenatal care expenses, poor, uninsured pregnant women are compelled to
meet with a battery of professionals—namely nutritionists, social workers, health
educators, and financial officers—who inquire into areas of women’s lives that frequently
exceed the realm of the medical. This paper argues that, as a result, Medicaid mandates
an intrusion into women’s private lives and produces pregnancy as an opportunity for
state supervision, management, and regulation of poor, uninsured women. In essence, the
receipt of Medicaid inaugurates poor women into the state regulatory apparatus. Further,
this paper argues that because the regime of prenatal care provided by the state-quaMedicaid is one delivered within a highly technological, biomedical paradigm of
pregnancy, poor women are produced as possessors of “unruly bodies.” Because the
uninsured poor are universally produced as such, I argue that the consequence is a
medicalization of poverty. As a result, the poor are treated as biological dangers within
the body politic. The paper begins with a presentation of Michel Foucault’s notion of
biopolitics and an explanation of its relationship to the regime of prenatal care at
operation in Alpha Hospital. A detailed description of the apparatus of professionals that
initiates women’s prenatal care at Alpha follows in Part Three. Part Four continues with
a description of the highly-technological care that is delivered as a matter of course at
Alpha. A brief conclusion follows in Part Five.
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INTRODUCTION

In May 2006, I began fieldwork in the obstetrics clinic at Alpha Hospital 1 —a large,
public hospital located on the east side of the island of Manhattan. For the first couple of
months of my research, I sat in the waiting area and simply observed clinic traffic. I
remember thinking that the place was incredibly familiar, yet undeniably strange. It was
familiar because, in many respects, it resembled the numerous doctors’ offices I have
frequented over the years—with the televisions that broadcast educational shows about
nutrition and exercise, the nurses that call out names in the waiting area, the magazines
sitting on tops of tables with the addressee information scribbled out with black marker,
and the friendly, though intimidating, doctors with their white lab coats and stethoscopes.
Yet, this obstetrics clinic remained strange—strange because hospital policy was to
require identification upon entry. Thus, one got the distinct feeling after passing through
security that one was entering into a potentially dangerous, but secured, place—like a
courthouse or airport. It remained strange because Alpha is one of the places where the
indigent, homeless, or otherwise dispossessed go when they are injured or sick. Thus,
when at Alpha, one may hold the elevator for a bandaged homeless man on one’s way up
to the obstetrics clinic. It remained strange because of the sheer diversity of the
population that seeks prenatal care there. Thus, on any given day, one can overhear
patients in the waiting area speaking English, Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, Polish,
Arabic, Bengali, Urdu, Hindi, and French. And so, for the first couple of months, I just
sat in the waiting room (eventually moving behind the front desk, and later into the
nurses’ triage rooms and doctors’ examination rooms) and scribbled descriptions in my
notebook of the strangely familiar place that was to be my field for the next year and a
half.
Over time, I learned that there existed a host of professionals who worked in the
obstetrics clinic in addition to the nurses and doctors: there were abortion counselors,
health educators, patient advocates, geneticists, nutritionists, HIV counselors, social
workers, and financial officers—the duty of the latter being to help uninsured pregnant
women apply for Medicaid. I eventually learned that prenatal care patients at Alpha
receiving Medicaid coverage of their medical expenses (or who are expected to
eventually receive Medicaid coverage of their medical expenses) 2 are compelled to meet
with a nutritionist, a social worker, a nurse/health educator, and a financial aid officer. 3
1

Pursuant to a standard ethnographic practice, all names—including the name of Alpha Hospital—and
anonymity-compromising details have been changed. In this Article, when I have quoted a portion of a
formal interview that I conducted with an Alpha patient or employee, I have indicated the month and the
year of the interview. However, when I have quoted remarks that were made in passing or snippets of
conversations that I overheard and hastily scribbled into my notebook, I have not provided specific
information about the month or year in which the quote was made.
2
I met only one woman during my tenure at Alpha who was not receiving Medicaid or any other
government-subsidized health insurance of her prenatal care expenses. This woman was ineligible for
Medicaid because her income exceeded the income limits set by Medicaid guidelines. Since becoming
pregnant, she had become a full-time employee at her place of employment (as opposed to a “contractor” to
the business that she had been in the years preceding her pregnancy) and had signed up for the health
insurance offered by her employer. However, the employer-based health insurance—and the other private
insurance plans that she had subsequently researched—refused to pay for her prenatal care expenses,
claiming that her pregnancy was a “preexisting condition.” Thus, she paid for her prenatal care (and labor
and delivery) expenses entirely out of her own pocket. Interview with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient
(Jan. 2007).
3
Patients are required to meet with the financial aid officer only if they do not have Medicaid coverage
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Because all Alpha prenatal care patients are expected to be or to become Medicaid
recipients, all Alpha prenatal care patients are compelled to meet with the latter group of
authorities. The requirement that women take on a confessional posture with a
nutritionist, social worker, nurse/health educator, and financial aid officer struck me as
potentially disturbing.
After a year and a half of sitting in Alpha’s bustling obstetrics clinic, I came to
believe that by compelling patients to meet with a battery of professionals who inquire
into areas of women’s lives that frequently exceed the realm of the medical, Medicaid
mandates an intrusion into women’s private lives and produces pregnancy as an
opportunity for state supervision, management, and regulation of poor, uninsured women.
In essence, this article argues that the receipt of Medicaid inaugurates poor women into
the state regulatory apparatus. Further, because the regime of prenatal care provided by
the state through Medicaid is one delivered within a highly technological, biomedical
paradigm of pregnancy, poor women are produced as possessors of “unruly bodies.”
Because the uninsured poor are universally produced as such, I argue that the
consequence is a medicalization of poverty. As a result, the poor are treated as biological
dangers within the body politic.
A brief note: When I argue that poor women are “produced” as possessors of unruly
bodies, I use the word “produce” in a conscious effort to evoke imagery of manufacture
upon presenting themselves to the hospital for prenatal care. Because a fair number of Alpha prenatal
patients have Medicaid insurance coverage prior to the pregnancy that brings them to the Alpha obstetrics
clinic, not all prenatal patients meet with the financial aid officer.
Although this Article discusses the specificities of the New York State version of Medicaid, the
critique of Medicaid offered within is—with a caveat—democratically available to all states participating in
the federal Medicaid program. In 1965, Congress created Medicaid, a federal-state cost sharing program
through which states are reimbursed for expenditures for medical services provided to qualified individuals.
THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, THE COST IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING ABORTION COVERAGE UNDER
MEDICAID, ISSUES IN BRIEF 1 (Oct. 1993). Individuals qualify for the program when their combined
incomes and resources are deemed by law to be insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical care. Id.
The Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP) should be understood as an expansion of Medicaid
coverage, specifically designed to provide pregnant women with medical services germane to their
pregnancies. In 1986, Congress established PCAP at the federal level to reimburse those states that offered
prenatal care to pregnant women whose incomes exceeded Medicaid eligibility standards. Kelley P. Swift,
Hope v. Perales: Abortion Rights Under the New York State Constitution, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 147677 (1995). To this effect, Congress amended the federal Medicaid statute and created an optional category
of Medicaid-eligible persons composed of pregnant women and infants with family incomes at or below
100% of the federal poverty line. Id. at 1477. Under the 1987 amendment to the federal Medicaid statute,
Medicaid coverage of pregnancy-related services became mandatory. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4101, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-1400 (1987). The amendment required each
state to extend eligibility to women whose income is up to 133% of the poverty line, but states can opt to
extend benefits to women whose income is up to 185% of the poverty line. Id.
In 1989, New York State enacted its own version of PCAP, which extended prenatal care services to
women with incomes between 100 and 185% of the federal poverty line. Prenatal Care Act of 1989, Ch.
584, (1989) N.Y. Laws 1224 (codified in N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2521, 2522, 2529, (McKinney 1989)
(effective Jan. 1, 1990)). New York’s PCAP now offers the maximum coverage allowed under federal
reimbursement standards.
New York State elected to fund and administer its PCAP program through the state Medicaid
program. Thus, within this Article, I use “Medicaid” as a proxy for “PCAP”—although other states that
elect to participate in the Medicaid program may not similarly administer and fund their prenatal care
programs. Nonetheless, to the extent that other states, like New York State, mandate the inclusion of the
“extra-medical” within the realm of the medical—that is, to the extent that other states require pregnant
women seeking prenatal care to meet with nutritionists, social workers, health educators, and the like—the
critique offered within should be understood as relevant.
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and industrial process. It is an effort to analogize the treatment of women’s bodies at
Alpha with the methodical creation of a product. In the case of pregnant women’s
bodies, however, the product that is ultimately produced is an unruly object that is most
competently managed by trained professionals. Moreover, to say that pregnant women’s
bodies are “produced” as unruly—in lieu of describing their bodies as “treated” or “seen”
as unruly—underscores that there is more at stake in the Alpha obstetrics clinic than the
mere representation of poor women’s bodies. That is, women’s bodies behave as unruly
when they are constantly measured, quantified, weighed, gauged, or otherwise assessed
within a technology that speaks in terms of normal and abnormal. Variations from the
norm become anxiety-marked occasions for further surveillance and the possibility of
disciplining the body back to normality. The bodies “produced” by the obstetrics clinic
through the nine month gestation of the fetus are not merely “conceptualized” as, or
“regarded” as, unruly; they behave accordingly. I take this point up further in Part IV.
In the following section, I present Foucault’s notion of biopolitics and explain its
relationship to the regime of prenatal care at operation in Alpha Hospital. A detailed
description of the apparatus of professionals that initiates women’s prenatal care at Alpha
follows in Part Three. Part Four continues with a description of the highly technological
care that is delivered as a matter of course at Alpha. A brief conclusion follows in Part
Five.
II.
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ALPHA OBSTETRICS AND THE FOUCAULDIAN BIOPOLITICAL PROJECT

Much has been written about the state’s interest in the production and management
of health—both of the individual and of the population. 4 Foucault most famously,
perhaps, elaborated upon this state interest via his notion of “biopolitics”: Whereas in the
classical age, state power was demonstrated in the exercise of producing death, in the
modern age, “this formidable power of death . . . now presents itself as the counterpart of
a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize,
4

Most germane to my project is the literature that discusses the state’s interest in reproduction. See
generally, Paula A. Treicher, Feminism, Medicine, and the Meaning of Childbirth, in BODY/POLITICS:
WOMEN AND THE DISCOURSES OF SCIENCE 120, 120 (M. Jacobus et al. eds., 1990) (“The health of
childbearing becomes a signal for the health of the state. Accordingly, decisions about pregnancy,
childbirth, and maternity have been concerns of the state as well as of the childbearing woman and her
family.”). This state interest in reproduction is pronounced during periods in which the birthrate is
perceived as either decreasing precipitously or increasing dangerously. See, e.g., Athena Athanasiou,
Bloodlines: Performing the Body of the ‘Demos,’ Reckoning the Time of the ‘Ethnos’, 24 J. MOD. GREEK
STUD. 229, 239 (2006) (discussing the “demographic crisis” in modern Greece, and arguing that “[i]n the
face of dwindling population, the self-interest of individual bodies joins forces with the larger social good
of the body politic in ways that tacitly bracket the internal differentiation of the national body as such; at
the same time, certain marked bodies (i.e., ethnic, racial, or sexual others) are excluded from the definition
of the category of ‘the people.’”); DAVID G. HORN, SOCIAL BODIES: SCIENCE, REPRODUCTION, AND
ITALIAN MODERNITY 5 (1994) (discussing the fascist Italian state’s concern with reproduction in the 1920s
and 30s, as declining fertility and a range of other procreative practices were constructed as social
problems; in response, the state developed a range of techniques of management and deployed a program of
government designed to know, manage, and promote fertility); Leith Mullings, Households Headed by
Women: The Politics of Race, Class, and Gender, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 125, 129 (Faye Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp, eds., 1995) (arguing that “[w]omen
as mothers—who are involved in both biological and cultural reproduction—become master symbols of
family, race, and civility, and are central to the authorized definition of the national community,” and
consequently, “[w]hen boundaries are threatened, rhetoric about fertility and population control escalates,
and native Euro-American women, preferably those of the dominant class, are exhorted to have children”).
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and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” 5
Foucault describes a “power over life” that
focus[es] on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life
and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births
and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy, and longevity, with all
the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected
through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a
biopolitics of the population. 6

¶7

¶8

Following Foucault, prenatal care presents itself as an occasion par excellence for the
state to “administer, optimize, and multiply” life, to subject the body to “precise controls
and comprehensive regulations,” and to ultimately gain a modicum of control over “the
level of health” of the population. 7
Yet, pregnancy is not a legal event. That is, the fact of pregnancy alone does not
put the pregnant woman within the jurisdiction of the biopolitical state. While the state
may desire to exercise its “power over life” by submitting the expectant mother and her
fetus to “an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls,” the pregnant woman is
not compelled to surrender herself to such a state project. Again, this is because, at
present, the fact of pregnancy alone does not enable the state to reach the woman and her
pregnant body with its biopolitical power. 8
The biopolitical state could achieve the regulation of every pregnant woman by
creating a law that mandates that women receive prenatal care either from state actors or
from persons that must otherwise answer to the state. However, at present, such a law
does not exist. Indeed, there is no law in the United States that makes criminal or
otherwise penalizes a woman’s failure to submit herself to any kind of prenatal care
during her pregnancy. That is, should a woman undergo the forty weeks of pregnancy
without ever having sought and/or received medical care from a physician, nurse
practitioner, midwife, or other professional whose services are intended to ensure the
birth of a healthy baby and the continued health of the new mother, I am not aware of any
5

1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 137 (Robert Hurley trans., 1980).
Id. at 139.
7
Id.
8
Foucault’s theory of biopolitics is remarkably elaborated upon when read in conjunction with historian
Barbara Duden’s work on the fetus. Duden’s book, Disembodying Women, is a historicization of “life”—
the religiously and morally significant notion that is, at present, hegemonically constructed as embodied in
the biological fact of the fetus. BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY
AND THE UNBORN (Lee Hoinacki, trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1991). Duden’s work encourages the
reader to imagine an alternate place and space where the fetus is understood differently than it is at present;
indeed, the fetus might be understood as little more than a “scientific fact” that appears some days or weeks
after the union of sperm and egg. However, Duden argues that, presently, the fetus has become
simultaneous with “life”; accordingly, the fetus has acquired the same religious and moral significance as
“life.” A scientific object, then, has become imbued with devastating import. Moreover, caretakers of the
fetus, i.e., physicians, have become charged with the magnificent duty of caring for “life.” Id. at 1-4.
Yet, it is instructive to think of Duden’s “life” alongside the “life” that is “administered, optimized,
and multiplied” within Foucauldian biopolitics: That the biopolitical state would have an interest in
pregnancy and obstetrical practice is a foregone conclusion when the (Foucauldian) “life” in which the state
has an interest first manifests itself in the fetus as sedimentation of (Dudenian) “life.” FOUCAULT, supra
note 5, at 137. Thus, prenatal care, as care of the fetus-cum-“life,” becomes a practice that the biopolitical
state would insist upon regulating.
6
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law that punishes such a woman’s behavior, or lack thereof. 9 In Colorado, a woman who
exposes her fetus to controlled substances may be found to have neglected her child and,
consequently, lose custody of the infant. 10 And, of course, once a baby is born, there are
a wealth of laws that punish a woman for directly harming or failing to protect her child.
But, prior to a baby’s birth, there is no law that penalizes a woman for “failing to protect”
her not-yet-born child by neglecting or otherwise refusing to have a medically-managed
pregnancy.
9

Interestingly, a woman that I interviewed told me that the social worker informed her that a woman will
“get into trouble” if she gives birth to a baby at Alpha and there is a record of fewer than four prenatal care
appointments for her. When I asked the social worker, in passing, if this was true, she laughed a bit and
said:
If somebody comes . . . to deliver and it seems like they haven’t been getting prenatal care here
or elsewhere, what happens is that they will hold the baby until they can get a nurse to go to the
home and see if everything is taken care of there. And once they get clearance, then the lady can
take the baby home. It’s not like they get in trouble. It’s just that we have to clear the air
because if she wasn’t prepared enough to come to prenatal care, who says that she’s prepared
enough to take care of a baby? That’s neglect. Why haven’t you been getting your prenatal
care? That’s neglect. It can cause birth defects and all sorts of things like that. It’s not that they
lose they baby. It’s just that we hold the baby long enough so that the nurse can check to see if
there is a crib and things like that. . . . We want to clear the air. After that, we let them go. But,
we don’t want Alpha to be on the front page of the paper—saying that some lady took her baby
home and bad things happened to it.
Relevantly, many visibly pregnant women present themselves for the first time to the Alpha
obstetrics clinic—without medical records of earlier prenatal care. If these women cannot manage to be
seen by the obstetrician four times before delivering their babies, then their babies will be held at the
hospital until “the air is cleared” at their homes. Although the hospital’s intent may be benign in refusing
to release these newborns to their mothers, it is difficult to conceptualize the inability to take one’s
newborn home as anything other than “getting into trouble.”
10
See People ex. rel. T.T., 128 P.3d. 328, 329 (Colo. App. 2005) (finding that although a petition for
neglect could not be “filed with respect to an unborn child because a fetus is not specifically included
within the statutory definition of ‘child,’” a pregnant woman who uses drugs can be found to have
neglected her “child” if the infant tests positive at birth for controlled substances); see also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 4011-B (2007) (requiring “a health care provider involved in the delivery or care of an infant
who the provider knows or has reasonable cause to suspect has been born affected by illegal substance
abuse . . . [to] notify the [Department of Human Services] of that condition in the infant,” yet clarifying that
the statute “may not be construed to require prosecution for any illegal action, including . . . the act of
exposing a fetus to drugs”); but see State v. Luster, 419 S.E. 2d 32, 34 (Ga. App. 1992) (holding that a
pregnant woman “could not reasonably have known that she would be prosecuted for ‘delivering’ or
‘distributing’ cocaine to her unborn child if she ingested cocaine while pregnant, and thus she did not
receive the ‘fair warning’ mandated by [Ga. Code Ann.] § 16-1-2(2) [(1968)]”).
In Killing the Black Body, Dorothy Roberts gives a history of the punitive response that states
have had toward women who use crack cocaine during their pregnancies. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING
THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997). Instead of helping these
women gain control over their addictions and lives, many states opted to punish pregnant drug users by
prosecuting them for crimes against their born and unborn children. A common punishment for women
who abuse drugs while pregnant is the commencement of child abuse and/or neglect proceedings against
them, and the subsequent state seizure of custody of their children. Id. at 159-60. Roberts recounts the
story of the first conviction of a woman for exposing her baby to drugs while she was pregnant: Jennifer
Clarise Johnson was convicted of two counts of delivering a controlled substance to her two children after
they tested positive for metabolites of crack cocaine shortly after their births. However, because the
relevant statute had not contemplated the delivery of a controlled substance to a fetus, the prosecution had
to prove that Johnson “delivered” crack cocaine to her children after they were born. The prosecution
accomplished this strange feat by offering the testimony of obstetricians who presented evidence that
Johnson had passed crack cocaine to her children via the umbilical cord; moreover, some forty-five to sixty
seconds would elapse between the child’s emergence from the uterus and birth canal and the clamping of
the umbilical cord. Hence, it was within those seconds that Johnson “delivered” crack cocaine to her
already-born children. Id. at 162-67.
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Undoubtedly, the power of moral sanctions imposed upon pregnant women who
fail to receive prenatal care should not be underestimated. Many of the pregnant women
I have encountered at Alpha Hospital are very much aware of the “immorality” of a
pregnant body unsupervised by a member of the medical establishment. On the unlikely
occasion that a woman is not aware that a pregnancy unmanaged by medicine opens her
up to moral condemnation, the employees of the OB/GYN clinic at Alpha Hospital often
provide this education. For example: the majority of patients with whom I have spoken
at Alpha Hospital’s OB/GYN clinic began their prenatal care shortly after discovering
their pregnancies and deciding that they wanted to carry them to term—usually within the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Then again, many patients decide to come to Alpha
Hospital after becoming dissatisfied with the care that they have received at another
hospital. These patients—usually quite far along in their pregnancies—are expected to
bring along with them documentation of their prenatal care from the other hospitals. This
holds true even though Alpha repeats all laboratory tests, ultrasounds, vaginal
examinations, and the like conducted by other hospitals. Hence, asking a woman for her
records from another hospital frequently functions only to shame those women who
cannot produce such documentation and provoke them into defending their
documentation-less status. Many times, women in the final weeks of their pregnancies,
yet seeking to begin prenatal care at Alpha Hospital, cannot produce such documents
because they have not been receiving prenatal care and have asserted that they were in
fact receiving care at another hospital solely to avoid moral censure. I have observed on
numerous occasions the women who work behind the front desk at Alpha Hospital—two
women who greet women arriving for their appointments and take their relevant
paperwork, and two other women who solely answer the clinic’s incoming telephone
calls—exchange looks of disapproval when a visibly pregnant woman without documents
seeks to begin her prenatal care at the hospital. 11 On one occasion, a prospective patient
(who, I eventually learned, had recently arrived in New York City from the Dominican
Republic) saw the disapproving glances and overheard a rhetorically-asked, “She doesn’t
have any papers?” In response, the patient answered back defensively and insolently, “I
was going to the doctor in my country, so don’t even worry about that!” 12
11

The phenomenon of requesting documents from patients in order to verify their receipt of prenatal care at
another location is interesting when analogized to another issue that impacts the lives of many of the
patients seeking prenatal care at Alpha Hospital—immigrant “illegality.” A person with a work or student
visa, “green card,” or other paperwork affirming her authorized position within the borders of the United
States—that is, a person with proper documentation—is said to be a “legal” immigrant to the United States.
Conversely, a person without such papers becomes identified as an “illegal alien.” Thus, the presence or
absence of documents determines the “legality” of a person. One might say that a similar operation is at
work in the prenatal care context: Those persons who can produce proper documentation of their prenatal
care have “legal pregnancies.” Those without proper documentation have “illegal pregnancies.” Of course,
the “legality” of a pregnancy just sketched has no relationship to the state and law insofar as a woman
cannot be punished by the state even if she is discovered to have an “illegal pregnancy.” However, the
“legality” of a pregnancy unquestionably impacts the way a woman is treated when she first presents
herself to the frontline at Alpha Hospital.
I intend to explore the larger phenomenon of the fetishization of paper generally in the OB/GYN
clinic at Alpha Hospital in a later piece.
12
Whether Alpha Hospital employees actually believe the accounts that women tell to explain their lack of
documentation is another story altogether. Minnie, a Patient Care Assistant (PCA, or medical assistant)
who often does intake work behind the front desk and has worked at Alpha Hospital for twenty-five years
said: “These patients tell you this and they tell you that. Who knows what they did in their country? Who
knows how they got here [to the United States]? That’s not my business. My business is to help them.”
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Although such moral sanctions are a powerful and effective force—which, at the
very least, inform women that failing to receive prenatal care is commonly viewed as
irresponsible behavior, but, more likely, induce pregnant women to actually submit
themselves to prenatal care—these moral sanctions are not “law.” Undoubtedly, moral
sanctions might and should be understood as assisting the state’s endeavor to encourage
poor women to submit themselves to a state-invested prenatal care program: a woman’s
feelings of guilt, due to moral condemnation of her medically-unsupervised pregnant
body, may cause her to seek prenatal care. If the only medical care she can afford is that
which is subsidized by the state, then the state finds itself a new subject upon her
acceptance of state-subsidized care, brought forth by acts of extralegal morality.
Nevertheless, morality is not law. That is, although moral sanctions may be analogized
to the law insofar as both have blanket applications and potentially punitive natures, the
state is not invested in moral sanctions and cannot directly use them to comprehensively
regulate the pregnant body. Finally, moral sanctions do not allow the state to fill the
extralegal, interstitial space of pregnancy. 13
¶11
While moral sanctions do not create legal subjects located within the state’s
biopolitical enterprise, Medicaid might. At Alpha Hospital and other facilities that accept
Medicaid insurance coverage for prenatal care, state subsidization of a pregnant woman’s
medical expenses via Medicaid functions as a carrot that entices women to submit
themselves to state supervision, management, regulation, and discipline. Women are
offered a contract where, in exchange for the state’s payment of medical bills, they are

It should be noted that the disbelief of patients’ prenatal care stories is part of a larger phenomenon
whereby patients are largely viewed by Alpha Hospital frontline employees as uneducated, yet somehow
incredibly shrewd, manipulators of the “system.” I intend to explore the intersection of these contradictions
in the fantasy of the patient—that is, the figure of the “wily patient”—in a later piece.
13
The state’s interest in pregnancy, and the concomitant creation of legal subjects of pregnant women,
might be explained differently—if one begins with the assumption that the state’s power is partially a
product of its omnipresence. One could theorize that it is the inability to avoid the law and the consequent
potential for state-sanctioned violence that contributes to the state’s strength. Admittedly, this is not a new
conceptualization of law: Walter Benjamin theorized a law that sought to be present enough to colonize all
acts of violence, which he considered a natural datum that necessarily undermined the state-qua-law. He
writes:
[T]he law’s interest in a monopoly of violence vis-à-vis individuals is explained not by the
intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by the intention of preserving the law itself; that
violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by
its mere existence outside the law.
1 WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1913-26, at 239 (Marcus Bullock &
Michael W. Jennings eds., 1996). Because extralegal violence threatens law, law must be present in all
places where violence might be exercised: “[T]his legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual
ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power.” Id. at
238. What Benjamin presents is an explanation of law’s ubiquity.
But what about those areas that law has failed to colonize? How does law assert itself in those
interstitial spaces that exist between legal power? Does the state-qua-law simply accept a weakening of its
strength? Or, more likely, does the state-qua-law attempt to assert itself in those interstitial spaces? When
the law cannot colonize by force, does the law then seek subjects who voluntarily submit themselves to its
jurisdiction, thereby maintaining law’s ubiquity, omnipresence, and consequent power? It would seem
logical that the state-qua-law would want to assert itself in the interstitial space of pregnancy because not
only would the state’s absence there weaken law’s power, but also because pregnancy is yet another
occasion to create legal subjects of women. Pregnancy is an almost ideal opportunity to entice women—
especially poor women—to put themselves within the state regulatory apparatus. So, the infiltration of the
law into the interstitial space of pregnancy becomes the state’s goal.
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obliged to open their lives to state intervention. A description of the process of initiating
prenatal care at Alpha Hospital illustrates the point.
III.

PRENATAL CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: INITIATION INTO THE STATE
REGULATORY APPARATUS

¶12

At Alpha Hospital, a woman must first take an Alpha Hospital-administered urine
test to confirm her pregnancy—without regard to whether she has already confirmed her
pregnancy with an at-home test. 14 A woman must then wait for the pregnancy test results
to be inputted into her electronic medical records (which usually takes one business day)
before she can receive her initial Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP) appointment.
A woman can only bypass the additional waiting period generated by the necessity of
waiting for the results of the hospital-administered pregnancy test if she has
documentation from another hospital or clinic confirming her pregnancy. If she does,
then she is immediately given an appointment to return for her PCAP visit. 15
¶13
On the day of her PCAP appointment, a woman meets with many Alpha Hospital
employees, each of which is described in the following sections. 16
14

There was some controversy in the clinic as to whether visibly pregnant women should be required to
take an Alpha Hospital-administered urine test to confirm their pregnancies. There was a contingent of
staff who believed that all women, regardless of physical condition, should be tested for pregnancy.
Another contingent believed that pregnant women need not confirm their pregnancies via urine testing
when they were “showing.” Thus, whether a visibly pregnant woman seeking to initiate prenatal care at
Alpha had to re-confirm her pregnancy by taking a hospital-administered pregnancy test depended on who
was working at the front desk when she first presented herself.
Interestingly, Betsy Gotbaum, the Public Advocate for the City of New York, released a report in
May 2007 describing the requirement that a woman re-confirm her pregnancy with a hospital-administered
pregnancy test as a “barrier” to prenatal care. BETSY GOTBAUM, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC
ADVOCATE, HURDLES TO A HEALTHY BABY: PREGNANT WOMEN FACE BARRIERS TO PRENATAL CARE AT
CITY HEALTH CENTERS 9 (2007), available at http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/policy/documents/Hurdlestoa
HealthyBaby.pdf. Gotbaum conceptualized the requirement as a “barrier” to care because a woman must
be physically present in the hospital to re-confirm her pregnancy in this way; consequently, the requirement
prevents women from making prenatal care appointments over the phone. Yet, the problem is even more
severe than Gotbaum’s report reveals insofar as women cannot simply make the desired appointment on the
day that they physically present themselves to the hospital. Rather, they must also wait another twenty-four
hours after submitting their urine for pregnancy testing—when the results are inputted into the computer
system—before they can make an appointment for prenatal care. Gotbaum argued that “Requiring a visit to
conduct a pregnancy test prior to a prenatal care appointment is an unsound and unnecessary policy.” Id. at
12. She recommended that “Instead of requiring an additional visit, clinics should confirm pregnancy at
the time of the first prenatal appointment. If the clinic-based pregnancy test produces a negative result, the
appointment should be used to provide the woman with preconception or interconception care, or family
planning and contraception counseling as appropriate.” Id. at 3.
15
Notably, Gotbaum also described as a “barrier” to prenatal care the necessity that women meet with a
registered nurse, HIV counselor, nutritionist, and social worker prior to having a medical examination. She
says:
Requiring multiple visits prior to the first prenatal care appointment not only delays entry into
prenatal care for pregnant women but also may discourage women already struggling to juggle
the demands of work and/or childcare or overcome other barriers to appropriate health care, such
as immigration, language, or transportation issues, or stigmatized behavioral issues. While
social workers, HIV counselors, and nutritionists provide valuable services, meeting with them
should not be a precondition for prenatal care . . . .
Id. at 13.
16
It should be noted that the PCAP appointment day tends to be an extremely long one, principally because
the woman must meet for long periods of time with several people. Sometimes “PCAP patients,” which is
their moniker on the day of their PCAP appointment, have to wait for one of the people with whom they
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A.

¶14

Registered Nurse

The nurse takes the woman’s medical history, asking if she has ever had any of a
number of medical problems, e.g., diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, gynecologic
surgery, anesthetic complications, and uterine anomalies. The nurse also records
information about any past pregnancies a woman has had—whether any were ectopic or
multiple, whether she carried the pregnancy to term or had a spontaneous or induced
abortion, and whether she suffered any complications during the pregnancy, labor, or
delivery. The nurse documents whether the woman has had any history of mental illness,
whether she has experienced trauma or violence in the past, and whether she consumes
tobacco, alcohol, or any other “illicit/recreational drugs” and, if so, in what amounts. 17
The nurse also provides the patient with what is called “education” 18 —involving a
number of matters that could conceivably affect the patient’s pregnancy, e.g., sexual
activity, exercise, travel, domestic violence, seatbelt usage, and the use of any
medications (“including supplements, vitamins, herbs, or O[ver] T[he] C[ounter]
must meet to complete other obligations. Additionally, if the patient does not speak English or Spanish
(most of Alpha Hospital employees who meet with PCAP patients know enough Spanish to conduct their
portion of the PCAP visit with patients who speak Spanish only), this language barrier tends to lengthen the
visit. The Alpha Hospital employee must then use the “language line”—a telephone with two receivers that
connects the employee and patient to a translator over the phone. The necessity of waiting for a translation
of every question and response almost doubles the length of the visit and potentially delays the ability of
the employee to begin her session with the next scheduled PCAP patient. Thus, women who have arrived
on time for their PCAP appointments may end up waiting another hour or two before they begin their
sessions. And again, once begun, their sessions may last two or three hours.
I stress the length of the PCAP day because it might be understood as training women to accept a
common characteristic of “public” institutions: hideously long waiting periods. Accordingly, the PCAP
day and its length teaches women that public institutions, which Alpha exemplifies, are frequently too
understaffed to effectively and efficiently meet the needs of those that depend on them. Insofar as the poor
are compelled to rely upon public institutions more than their non-poor counterparts, the length of the
PCAP appointment day might be understood as educating PCAP patients about what it means to be poor in
the United States, how the poor are commonly treated, and the expectations that the poor should have when
negotiating these institutions.
17
All of this information is recorded on a standardized form produced by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)—the ACOG Antepartum Record. (ACOG is a non-profit
organization comprised of physicians that sets standards of healthcare in the OB/GYN specialty.) The form
solicits sociological data such as birth date, age, marital status, and, interestingly, race. ACOG Antepartum
Record, Form A (on file with author).
18
The language used by Alpha employees and on Alpha forms is “education”; that is, Alpha employees are
expected to “educate” patients. For example, an itinerary of the employees with whom the patients meet on
the day of their PCAP appointment is listed on the “Patient Education Flow Sheet”; the matters that they
discuss are broken down into “1st Trimester Education Topics,” “2nd Trimester Education Topics,” and
“3rd Trimester Education Topics”; further, the Alpha employee must document that each topic was
discussed by checking a box marked “health education/literature given.” Alpha Hospital Patient Education
Flow Sheet (on file with author). Alpha Hospital’s use of the term “education,” in reference to the vast
quantities of information given to women during their PCAP appointments and over the course of their
pregnancies, mirrors the language of the ACOG Antepartum Record forms, which label the topics that
should be discussed with the patients as “Plans/Education.” ACOG Antepartum Record, Form E (on file
with author). Then again, ACOG articulates the objective of the organization as the promotion of “patient
education and [the] stimulati[on] of patient understanding of and involvement in medical care.” American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, http://www.acogupdate.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
Nevertheless, I find the use of the term “education” problematic insofar as Alpha employees inform their
patients about only one—albeit the dominant and most powerful—model of pregnancy and childbirth: the
biomedical model. It might be more appropriate to regard the program of knowledge given to the patients
by Alpha employees as “training,” as opposed to “education.” Cf. DUDEN, supra note 8, at 25 (“Each
prenatal visit to the clinic serves as a training session for the forthcoming game.”).
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drugs”). 19 Additionally, the nurse draws blood and takes a urine sample from the patient
in order to conduct a battery of tests, including blood type, Rh type, and hemoglobin
electrophoresis. The nurse’s final task is to refer the patient to the Women, Infants, and
Children Program for Pregnant, Breastfeeding, and Postpartum Women (WIC) by
completing a medical referral form. 20 The patient must take the form to the WIC office in
Alpha Hospital to receive food vouchers, which can be redeemed at grocery stores and
farmers’ markets that have been approved by the New York State Department of Health
(NYSDOH).
B.
¶15

HIV Counselor

As per NYSDOH guidelines, all patients must receive counseling as to the
“benefits of HIV testing as early in pregnancy as possible to reduce perinatal
transmission” and the “meaning of the test results for both mother and newborn.” 21
Further, all patients receive an “explanation that all cases of HIV infection and names of
all partners known to the provider will be reported to the NYSDOH for epidemiological
and partner/spousal notification purposes only.” 22 Hence, all PCAP patients meet with a
counselor who discharges this duty. If the patient assents to the test, the blood drawn by
the nurse is tested for the presence of HIV-antibodies. If the woman does not assent to
the test, the counselor must document the articulated reasons for declining testing. 23

19

ACOG Antepartum Record, Form E, supra note 18. At a prenatal care visit that takes place later in the
pregnancy, patients are counseled on the “signs and symptoms of preterm labor, anesthesia/analgesia plans,
fetal movement monitoring, circumcision, breast or bottle feeding, postpartum depression, and newborn car
seat.” Interestingly, patients are also counseled on “postpartum family planning/tubal sterilization.” At the
bottom of the form is a place where the nurse should indicate whether the “tubal sterilization consent [has
been] signed.” Id. My initial query is to wonder whether the concern with contraception—especially
permanent sterilization—would hold true for patients whose pregnancies are not problematized, i.e., nonpoor, non-immigrant, “non-raced” (read: White) women.
20
WIC is a federal program, administered by the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH),
whose mission is “to safeguard the health of low-income women, infants, and children up to age 5 who are
at nutritional risk by providing nutritious foods to supplement diets, information on healthy eating, and
referrals to health care.” Women, Infants, and Children Program for Pregnant, Breastfeeding, and
Postpartum Women, About WIC, http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/aboutwic/default.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2008). WIC participants receive food vouchers for “foods [that] are high in one or more of the following
nutrients: protein, calcium, iron, and vitamins A and C. These are the nutrients frequently lacking in the
diets of the program’s target population. Different food packages are provided for different categories of
participants.” UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WIC FACT SHEET 2 (2006), available at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WIC-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter WIC FACT
SHEET].
21
This language is taken from the “Alpha Hospital HIV Pre-Test Counseling” form, which is not a form
prepared by NYSDOH. Alpha Hospital HIV Pre-Test Counseling Form (on file with author).
22
Id.
23
Because I have never observed an HIV counseling session (for confidentiality reasons), I am not aware to
what extent and how the counselor encourages the woman’s acquiescence to HIV testing. A denial of
testing by the patient appears to be disfavored, although the fact that a positive test result is shared as a
matter of course with the patient’s partner may represent a massive deterrent to a woman’s consent to
testing. One patient, with whom I developed a friendship over the course of her pregnancy, declined
testing at Alpha because, since becoming aware of her pregnancy, she had been tested twice for HIV at
other healthcare facilities. From notations made in her chart, it appears that employees at Alpha asked the
patient for consent to HIV testing at every prenatal care visit—that is, until she produced documentation of
the negative test results from one of the other facilities at which she was tested. This patient’s experience
makes it appear that HIV testing is highly encouraged at Alpha.
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C.

Nutritionist

¶16

Each patient must meet with a nutritionist who documents the patient’s diet,
records any known food or non-food allergies, notes whether the patient has had any
difficulty eating due to nausea or vomiting, and provides information to the patient about
the nutritional needs of women during their pregnancies. During the meeting with the
nutritionist, patients are asked to record what they ate for breakfast, lunch, and dinner the
day before. Afterwards, they are given a chart with an itemization of foods (e.g., milk,
cheese, meat, eggs, fruit, cereal); then they are asked to circle the number of times per
day (or alternatively, per week) foods are consumed. After the assessment, they are
given information about the prenatal diet’s relationship to a “healthy baby,” dietary
recommendations for pregnancy, and “tips” on how to increase or control weight gain, as
needed. Should the nutritionist find the patient’s diet unsatisfactory, she checks a box
labeled “inadequate/unusual dietary habits” and asks the patient to make a verbal
commitment to meet the nutritional needs of herself and her fetus.
¶17
Interestingly, the nutritionist’s assessment of the patient’s diet has a direct
relationship to a woman’s eligibility for WIC. Because, by statutory caveat, WIC food
vouchers are only available to those pregnant women who are at “nutritional risk,” it is in
the patient’s interest—that is, if she is interested in receiving WIC vouchers—that the
nutritionist find fault with her diet and, concurrently, enable her eligibility for WIC. 24 In
fact, most of the pregnant patients at Alpha with whom I have spoken had been approved
for WIC and were receiving food vouchers. 25 This leads me to believe that, as a practice,
the nutritionist summarily deems a patient’s diet insufficient in order to qualify her for
WIC. An example from a patient’s chart: After assessing the patient’s diet, the
nutritionist wrote, “Diet needs improvement—limited intake [of calcium] food, protein
food, fruits and juice.” However, the patient appeared (to the lay observer) to have an
adequate diet and a healthy appetite: the previous day, the patient drank tea for breakfast,
ate a sandwich with turkey, cheese, lettuce, tomatoes and mayonnaise for lunch, ate rice
with broccoli in garlic sauce for dinner, and snacked on a banana post-dinner. Moreover,
24

The statute specifies that in order for a woman to be certified as eligible for WIC, she must be
“determined to be at nutritional risk. . . . This determination may be based on referral data submitted by a
competent professional authority not on the staff of the local agency,” e.g., a nutritionist employed in the
clinic where a woman receives her prenatal care. 7 C.F.R. § 246.7e (2006). A woman should be deemed
eligible for WIC if she has “[d]etrimental or abnormal nutritional conditions detectable by biochemical or
anthropometric measurements, such as anemia, underweight, overweight, abnormal patterns of weight gain
in a pregnant woman,” “[o]ther documented nutritionally related medical conditions, such as clinical signs
of nutritional deficiencies, metabolic disorders, [or] . . . a history of high risk pregnancies or factors
associated with high risk pregnancies (such as smoking; conception before 16 months postpartum; history
of low birth weight, premature births, or neonatal loss; adolescent pregnancy; or current multiple
pregnancy),” “[d]ietary deficiencies that impair or endanger health, such as inadequate dietary patterns
assessed by a 24-hour dietary recall, dietary history, or food frequency checklist,” or “[c]onditions that
predispose persons to inadequate nutritional patterns or nutritionally related medical conditions, such as
homelessness or migrancy.” Id.
25
There was one patient with whom I built a rapport who declined to receive and redeem the WIC food
vouchers for which she had been approved. Her reason for declining state aid in the form of subsidization
of her food expenses was her belief that if she could afford to bear the expense on her own, she should.
She said, “I’m okay [financially] for now. When the baby comes, I’ll use it—but, not really for that [the
milk and cereal that WIC provides women]. Just for, like, formula, because that’s expensive.” Interview
with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (July 2007). There seemed to be a shame associated with the
receipt of food vouchers that this woman wanted to avoid for as long as she could. I intend to explore
issues of welfare, shame, and race in a later piece.
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although the nutritionist had noted that the patient had a “limited intake” of calcium,
protein, fruits, and juice, the patient had indicated that she consumed milk, cheese, eggs,
and beans more than four times per week, drank juice as often, and ate fruits and
vegetables at least twice a day. Nevertheless, per a notation in her chart, the patient was
referred for and enrolled in WIC.
¶18
The one patient that I met who did not receive Medicaid and was paying for her
prenatal care out-of-pocket, Irina, is a revealing outlier. Irina had refused to enroll in
WIC, and in her chart, the WIC medical referral form was blank, save for the nurse’s
scribbling of “PT REFUSED.” Nevertheless, the nutritionist had indicated that the
patient’s “diet needs improvement . . . . Limited in protein food, fruits, juice and
vegetable. Eats sugar cereals.” The nutritionist had also checked a box indicating that the
patient was at “moderate risk” due to her “inadequate/unusual dietary habits.” Like the
case cited above, Irina had consumed an ostensibly healthy amount of healthy foods over
the course of the previous day: Cheerios with soy milk, orange juice, a roll, an egg, two
servings of cheese, several glasses of water, beet soup, bread, avocados, bean sprouts,
lettuce, a glass of soy milk, vegetable soup, yogurt, peach cobbler, decaffeinated tea, and
Corn Pops. 26 Irina’s case would seem to indicate either that the nutritionist deemed her
diet insufficient only because the nutritionist did not know that Irina was uninterested in
enrolling in WIC and, otherwise, would not have found fault with her diet as she did, or
alternatively, that the nutritionist summarily disapproves of every patient’s diet. Either
way, I find the presumptive condemnation of women’s diets a bit disturbing as a
moralistic gesture—even when done with the design to enable WIC eligibility. One
could imagine an alternate space where WIC eligibility is not endangered by a
nutritionist’s honest and reasonable finding that a woman’s diet is indeed healthy.
¶19
I would like to stress that while many women with whom I have spoken welcome
their meetings with the nutritionist and appreciate the information given to them, just as
many women found the coerced consultation offensive. For example, when I asked Willa
about her meeting with the nutritionist, she said, “I get really uncomfortable talking to
nutritionists.” When I asked her why, she said:
Willa: I don’t like to do it. It makes me really uncomfortable.
Khiara: Really? Why is that—do you think? Has it always been that way?
Willa: Yeah. Because it’s always been such an issue of tension. And my
family has always been so much about healthy eating—but, we’re all fat.
So, it really stresses me out. Like, we’re all overweight. Yet, we’re
always so educated. So, it makes me angry. . . . And I always feel like I’m
not really eating the way I should. . . . No—it’s true. I don’t like talking
about it. It’s weird. Can we change the subject, please? [Laughs.] 27

26

During our interview, this patient provided more color to her session with the nutritionist during which
she received her nutritional assessment: “The nutritionist told me that I wasn’t eating enough dairy or
something and I was like . . . . Cottage cheese has been my craving and that’s my—really, my first trimester
craving was cottage cheese with Thousand Island dressing on it. Now I’d probably vomit if I ate that. But
it was delicious at the time.” Interview with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (June 2007).
27
Interview with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (June 2007).
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¶20

While I was happy to oblige Willa by immediately asking her a question about a
different topic, I imagine that she could not so easily “change the subject” during her
requisite meeting with the nutritionist.
¶21
Another example: I made polite conversation with a woman, Gladys, whom I had
interviewed earlier in her pregnancy. She told me about recent developments in her life
and her excitement about her baby’s upcoming birth. She also told me about a
conversation with the nutritionist that she had had at her last prenatal care visit two weeks
prior. She said:
She [the nutritionist] was trying to tell me that I had gained too much
weight. Just a couple of weeks ago, they were trying to tell me that I
wasn’t gaining enough weight. Now, she’s trying to tell me that I’m
overweight. I’m not overweight; I’m normal. Hello? I’m Black. I have
hips. I have a butt. [Laughs.] I’m supposed to go back to see her today,
but I’m not going to.
I cite these examples to emphasize that coercing a woman to confess her dietary habits to
a nutritionist is not always a benign affair.
D.

Social Worker

¶22

Although oddly paired, the screening that the nutritionist performs is identified as a
“Nursing Nutrition/Psychosocial Assessment.” Thus, after the nutritionist asks the
patient questions about food allergens, diet, and eating problems, she then determines
whether the patient has any of the “risk factors” identified on the “Alpha Hospital
Psychosocial Screening” form. These factors are the following: “unwanted pregnancy;
teen pregnancy; foster care/surrender for adoption planned; HIV positive; [history of] or
current substance abuse; high risk medical problems/poor [obstetric history]; anxiety;
lack of familial/environmental support system; marital/family problems; domestic
violence; depression; concern [regarding] capacity to care for a newborn; retardation;
[history] of psychiatric treatment/or current emotional disturbance; lack of
entitlement/benefits; homeless/shelter resident.” 28 There is also a box to check if “no
referral [is] necessary at this time.” If the nutritionist deems a social work referral
appropriate for a patient, she escorts the patient to the social worker’s office. The social
worker then acquires more information from the patient about the “risk factor,” and if
necessary, puts her in contact with additional professionals who can assist her.
¶23
In practice, the above mentioned list of risk factors is not exclusive, and the
expectation is that the social worker will see all of the PCAP patients who come through
the obstetrics clinic. As explained to me by one of the social workers, Medicaid
eligibility is sufficient to establish the woman as “at social risk,” thereby making a social
work referral apt and appropriate. Accordingly, all PCAP patients are compelled to meet
with a social worker and encouraged to divulge personal information. 29 To a pregnant
28

Alpha Hospital Psychosocial Screening Form (on file with author).
It should be noted that although all Alpha patients are required to meet with a social worker, the social
workers are not always successful in meeting with all of the patients. Tina, one of the social workers,
explained to me (with a great degree of frustration) that this is primarily because Alpha PCAP patients must
meet with a number of staff members on the day of their PCAP appointments. Meetings with the social
29
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woman solely expecting routine prenatal care during her visit to the hospital, it may seem
a bit odd that prior to having a standard and routine medical examination by someone
qualified to do so, she must meet with a social worker and be expected to take on a
confessional posture. 30
¶24
The invasive nature of a coerced confessional may be somewhat mitigated by the
fact that many patients’ meetings with the social worker are uneventful. 31 When a
workers are commonly viewed as less important than the numerous blood and urine draws, the nutritional
assessment/WIC referral, and the Medicaid subscription process with the financial officer. Hence, the
requisite meeting with the social worker is often bypassed if time limitations compel it. Tina explained,
“Yes, we miss a lot of people, which is a problem, because we’re supposed to see one hundred percent. It’s
a really bad situation because everyday there are PCAPs. Everyday, there are new patients. So, it’s difficult
as it is to catch all of the new ones each day. So, if you miss one, well—you may catch her at her next visit.
But, on her next visit, there’s a whole set of new patients, which you have to see all of. So, missing a
patient—yeah, it’s a bad situation.” Interview with anonymous social worker (Jan. 2007). She added that
she and the other social worker were not penalized—“other than the embarrassment”—for failing to see all
of the PCAP patients.
However, all women who deliver at Alpha Hospital are required to meet with a social worker prior
to being discharged from the hospital and taking their babies home with them. Tina stated that as a result,
“if there isn’t already a database on them, then they’ll create one then.” Id. Accordingly, it appears
difficult for a patient to avoid the compelled confession that is simultaneous with a required social work
consultation.
30
Undoubtedly, the assistance given by the social worker is desired by many patients. I have encountered
many patients who, during subsequent visits to the clinic for prenatal care, request to speak with the social
worker with whom they met during the initial PCAP visit. For example, one patient, who had become
homeless and was consequently placed in temporary/emergency housing by the New York City Department
of Human Services (“DHS”), had been transferred to another shelter that she believed was unsanitary and
located irresponsibly far from Alpha Hospital. She sought out the social worker, who documented that
conditions at the shelter were unsatisfactory, with “bedbugs and poor kitchen amenities in which to
refrigerate the milk she receives from WIC and to cook and adequately feed herself/baby.” Time was of
the essence, for if the patient stayed in the shelter for more than 48 hours, it was to be deemed a “permanent
placement,” thereby making it incredibly (read: bureaucratically) difficult for her to be reassigned to
another DHS shelter. To assist the patient, the social worker obtained a letter of “Medical Necessity” from
the patient’s provider—a midwife—stating the midwife’s request that the patient “be transferred for
medical necessity and the health of her child to a facility suitable for a pregnant women [sic] and closer to
our facility.” Due to the assistance of the social worker, the letter was obtained on the day the patient
requested it, and the patient was moved to a more hygienic shelter that was, indeed, closer to Alpha
Hospital.
31
The following record of a patient’s meeting with the social worker is similar to many of the social
worker’s notations made in patients’ charts, and is, therefore, characteristic of the exceedingly mundane
quality of a large portion of the social worker’s interactions with patients:
Pt [patient] is a 29 y/o, Polish, married, female who is pregnant [. . .]; EDD [expected date of
delivery] 7-3-07. Pt was referred from HRC [High-Risk Clinic] to be seen for a routine
psychosocial assessment. Pt is seen in High Risk clinic diagnosed with Thyroid since two years
ago. Pt uses Thyroxin 125mg. Pt states her mother has High Blood Pressure. Pt has Medicaid
and Metro Plus number [. . .]. Pt states that she and husband [. . .] 28 y/o are happy about this
unplanned pregnant [sic]. Pt cell phone number is [. . .] and home phone number is [. . .]. Pt
reports a stable marriage for five years. Pt lives with husband and he is only support system. Pt
is alert and participated. Parents are in Poland with one sister. Pt is the youngest child in the
family, born and raised in Poland. Pt completed 5 years of college education in Poland, can read
and write in English and Polish. Pt is employed part time as a Bookeeper [sic] and earns
$128.00 [per week]. Husband work [sic] as an electrician his salary is $400.00 a week. Pt.
denies any history of substance and sexual abuse, arrest, psychological problems or domestic
violence.
Pt was referred to social work from PNC [Prenatal Clinic] to be seen for a routine psychosocial
assessment. Pt is domiciled and undocumented. Pt was alert and oriented. Pt has an [sic]
limited support system. Pt was receptive to social work intervention and answered all questions
asked. Pt will breast and bottle feed the baby. Pt will think about contraceptives and CNS for
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woman has “no issues,” 32 such social work referrals may be perceived as just another
bureaucratic hurdle a woman must overcome before having a medical examination. Tina,
one of the social workers, explained that a patient with “no issues” simply will be given a
packet of information on physiological changes she can expect during pregnancy and
social services available to pregnant and parenting women. Even so, Tina acknowledged
that the intervention that she is required to make by Medicaid has a strange location
within the obstetric clinic:
Tina: A lot of times, the patients don’t know why they have to see a social
worker. It’s really strange. But, it’s required by PCAP—their insurance.
Khiara: Most of the time, do patients volunteer—well, let’s say that [the
nurse] brings [a patient] over. Would she be receptive to social work?
Most of the time, do you find that?
Tina: Very rarely—usually when they decline, there’s something to hide.
But generally, even if they’re not thrilled—if they didn’t come to the
hospital and say, “OK, I want to see a social worker!” . . . Even if that’s
not how they’re coming, once they are here, they participate. And then
once you give them the packet of information, they’re appreciative. Even
the experienced mom is appreciative of the information packet. 33
¶25

Alternatively, social work referrals may be perceived as a gross, unwelcome
imposition into matters seemingly irrelevant to the desired prenatal medical examination,
which, it should be underscored, is the principal reason women present themselves to the

well care baby. Pt was counseled on the importance to comply with appointments and
preparations for the birth of baby such as crib, car seat and clothing. This interview was
conducted in English. Pt will continue [prenatal care] at Alpha Hospital.
32
Tina gave me an exhaustive list of the questions that she asks patients during their social work screening:
Was this pregnancy wanted and do you want to have this baby? Do you have any experience?
. . . If you’re a first-time mom, do you have anybody who can teach you how to take care of a
baby? Is the father involved? Do you have a place to live? Money to buy things for the baby?
A social support system? Do you have anything in your history that might make the parenting
difficult? There might be things that surface for you at a time when you need to be at your best
for your baby. Is there any child abuse, sexual abuse, domestic violence? . . . Is there any
substance abuse? Does she consider it a problem? Is she in a program? Has she been arrested?
Has she ever had any children taken away from her—which means that she has a history of poor
parenting? Are you breastfeeding, bottle-feeding? Did you apply for WIC? . . . After you
deliver this child and are taking care of a newborn, do you plan on having another baby right
away? If you’re not, it’s easier to not [become pregnant again] if you [choose a contraceptive
that you could leave in place for long periods of time]. Do you know what options are out there?
Are you going to breastfeed? If you are, there are [contraceptives] that are better while you’re
breastfeeding. Do you have everything that you’re going to need to know? Do you want
parenting classes? Yes—you can go here for them. Do you have everything that you’re going to
need for the baby? No—try going to this place. Maybe they can help you. You have to be in
the best condition that you can be in for your baby. So, maybe you should get counseling. Here
are some places that you can go.
Interview with anonymous social worker (Jan. 2007).
33
Id.
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obstetrics clinic at Alpha Hospital. One patient’s file revealed such a polemical
encounter, per the social worker’s notation recorded in the medical record:
Pt [patient] is a 32 y/o Hispanic, single, female who is pregnant . . .; EDD
[expected date of delivery] 6-10-07. Pt was seen for a follow up on ACS
[Administration for Children’s Services] cases. This worker tried to get
information from patient regarding the new case that ACS worker Mr.
Jones mention [sic] to this worker but patient just stated that there is
nothing new to report. Mr. Jones did not allow Ms. Jane Doe the new
worker on the case [to] talk to this worker. Ms. Doe’s tel. Number is [. . .]
Mr. Jones telephone number is [. . .]. This worker discuss [sic] the case
with Supervisor, Hannah Williams who is going to follow it.
¶26

In this instance, the patient was discovered to be the subject of an investigation by
ACS, the bureau of municipal government responsible for protecting children from abuse
and neglect. The patient appears to have viewed the compelled meeting with the social
worker as an undesired and undesirable imposition and, consequently, refused to
cooperate with the social worker. The social worker, in turn, contacted the ACS
caseworkers directly, and, failing to acquire their cooperation, referred the matter to her
immediate supervisor, who “is going to follow it.” This is a remarkable sequence of
events when considered in context—a woman’s presentation at a hospital for routine
prenatal care. 34
¶27
Furthermore, obligatory social work consultations are potentially less problematic
when they are designed to empower the woman by providing her with information and
services of which she may avail herself. Yet, on many occasions, it becomes obvious that
the social worker is instead situated antagonistically to the woman; that is, the social
worker reveals herself to be acting as the agent of a potentially punitive state. 35 Below, I
quote at length a portion of an interview that I conducted with a patient, Ashley, and her
boyfriend, Paul:
Khiara: And you spoke to the social worker. How was that meeting with
the social worker? Uneventful?
34

I had the pleasure of speaking with this patient, Rhonda, at length during an in-depth interview. She
explained to me that she had become the subject of an Administration for Children’s Services [ACS]
investigation as the culmination of a succession of events. Her youngest son was born at 24-weeks
gestation, and as a result, is severely physically and mentally disabled. He is seen by a specialist in Alpha
Hospital, who as Rhonda explained, is committed to seeing her son walk. (At present, he is confined to a
wheelchair.) When Rhonda became ill due to her pregnancy, and was unable to take her son to one of his
regularly-scheduled doctor’s appointments, the physician reported her to ACS—the rationale being that she
was “neglecting” her son by failing to bring him to his physical therapy. Rhonda was not angered by
having been reported to ACS by her son’s physician. She says that her son’s physician jokingly told her,
“You know I called the peoples [sic] on you. But, it’s because I want to see my boy walk.” She also says
that the visit to her home by ACS investigators was uneventful; they “looked around and left.” But, she
was fearful that the social worker from the obstetrics clinic would reactivate ACS’s interest in her by
making unnecessary inquiries into a matter that had already been resolved. Interview with anonymous
obstetrics clinic patient (Jan. 2007).
35
I do not mean to argue that the social workers are always acting as agents of a potentially punitive state.
Instead, they always have the potential to become agents of that state. Accordingly, it appears rather
invidious to compel a woman to confess information about herself to an individual who has the option of
using that information against her.
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Ashley: Yeah. I didn’t like her. . . .
Khiara: What didn’t you like about her?
Ashley: I thought she was very forceful. And I didn’t like her attitude.
They were like—I have some mental health issues . . . . And I told her
about them—just being honest and everything. And she was like, “You
know, you’re going to have to go see the psychologist. And if the
psychologist thinks—recommends drugs, you’re going to have to take
them or else your baby’s going to be taken away.” I was like, “Don’t
scare me like that!”
Paul: Total scare tactics.
Ashley: Total scare tactics. And I didn’t appreciate it. And she was, like,
pushing, like . . . . If I don’t want to take Prozac, I don’t have to. I can do
without it during my pregnancy. But, she was so, like, forceful. And then,
Paul was sitting outside. [Initially], she didn’t want him to be there. And
then she was like, “Do you want me to bring him in? Do you want me to
tell him?” What? [Laughs.]
Paul: “You have to take your medicine!” [Laughs.] . . .
Khiara: The interesting thing is that, had you not mentioned—because you
volunteered the information and the mental history that you have. And
because you volunteered it, she sort of ran with it. You know?
Ashley: Yeah, it was very strange because I volunteered it because—
because I wanted help and I wanted to do this properly. But, I don’t want
to be pushed drugs and pushed someone else—encourage someone else to
push drugs on me. That’s one of the reasons why I came here: because I
didn’t want the epidural! [Laughs.] I don’t want it pushed on me.
Khiara: Ironically.
Ashley: I didn’t appreciate her. It left me feeling very sour that day.
Khiara: That’s too bad. Because you shouldn’t have those experiences,
you know? Did she actually force you to go see the psychologist?
Ashley: I wanted to. That’s one of the things I wanted to do. Yeah, she
did set that up for me.
Khiara: And have you met with that person?
Ashley: Yeah, I see her every week.
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Khiara: Does she push drugs?
Ashley: No! Not at all. No.
Khiara: I wonder why that is that [the social worker] felt compelled to be
heavy-handed. . . .
Ashley: She was quite heavy-handed. I just don’t—I didn’t understand.
But, like, at first I was fighting with her. I was like, “No!” You know?
Like, I was coming up with all these arguments about why it’s not right.
And then I was like, “Oh, just shut up! She’s not going to get it.” 36
¶28

Now, one may find the social workers’ interventions with Rhonda and Ashley
unproblematic—even laudable—understanding it as indicative of Alpha Hospital’s
commitment to all aspects of the health of their pregnant and unborn patients. The theory
might be that prenatal care involves more than ensuring that the pregnant woman’s
amniotic fluid level remains stable and the fetus grows at a consistent rate; prenatal care
also involves ensuring that the social environment into which a woman brings her
newborn is healthful and life-affirming. 37 However, one must bear in mind that this
“holistic” approach to prenatal care is made compulsory for patients who do not have
private insurance and made optional for their private insurance-holding counterparts.
That is, while private insurance-holding expectant mothers can forego the requirement of
a social work assessment by electing to receive prenatal care from a private hospital or
physician that eschews such a requirement, the poor-qua-public-insurance-holders are
36

Interview with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (Mar. 2007).
This argument might be read as asserting that the “private spheres” of public insurance-holders at Alpha
Hospital are opened up to surveillance, management, and regulation. When considered in this manner,
Horn’s work on the state’s concern with reproduction in Fascist Italy becomes relevant. Horn examines the
re-imagination in 1920’s and 30’s Italy of what is presently considered the dichotomized public and private
spheres. He writes that in that space and place, individuals were conceptualized as having “social bodies,”
“located neither in ‘nature’ nor in the private sphere—but in that modern domain of knowledge and
intervention carved out by statistics, sociology, social hygiene, and social work.” HORN, supra note 4, at 4.
He notes that during this time, a school of interwar jurists argued that the family should not be regarded as
a “natural institution” that preceded society and eluded the purview of the state. “It was instead to be
imagined as a social institution, open to and perhaps requiring state intervention and therefore transcending
the domain of private law.” Id. at 66. Against Catholic and liberal thought of the era, there was a
collection of thinkers who contended that the family was a “social formation” that functioned in the
national interest. One scholar, Cicu, maintained that “the family was not a social entity but also a
governmental entity. The family carries out a state function, and it is this juridical end that justifies the
vigilance and intervention of the powers of the State.” Id. at 68.
It would appear that the social workers at Alpha Hospital, who must inquire into “private” elements
of patients’ lives in order to better ascertain the nature of the families into which the patients’ fetuses will
be later born, are charged with the duty of enacting these patients’ families as “public” and/or governmental
institutions—analogous to the work that was done in interwar Italy. If public insurance-holding patient
families may be conceived of as a “public” or governmental institution, even liminally so, how does this
impact the meaning of the “right to privacy” as a guarantee of reproductive freedoms? Historically, this
right was designed to protect families as private institutions from public intervention. However, what is the
meaning of that protection for families that are conceptualized and treated as public institutions?
Moreover, if it is true that the right to privacy has transformed over time into an individual-inhering right,
does it still protect individuals who are members of “public” families, i.e., poor individuals? I intend to
explore all of these questions and more in another piece.
37
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compelled to undergo such interventions. They have no choice in the matter, which can
be understood as extremely unjust.
E.

Medicaid Financial Officer

¶29

In the state of New York, Medicaid coverage is available to all pregnant women,
regardless of immigration status. 38 Those pregnant women who do not have any health
insurance at the time of their PCAP appointments are instructed to meet with the
Medicaid Financial Officer stationed in the Alpha OB/GYN clinic. 39 The financial
officer explains to the patient that she needs to submit documents establishing proof of
pregnancy, identity, address, and income in order to qualify for Medicaid and, thus, have
her medical expenses covered by the state. 40
¶30
Needless to say, the process of applying for Medicaid can be stressful and anxietyproducing, especially for those patients who are residing in the country “illegally,” i.e.,
without proper documentation. 41 Establishing proof of income may be nearly impossible
for those women who either work “off the books” at businesses, or who receive cash as
payment for work performed informally, like babysitting or housecleaning. 42 A woman
38
Medicaid in New York State, http://www.health.state.ny.us/health_care/medicaid (last visited Jan. 14,
2008). Eligibility for coverage commences at the beginning of the pregnancy and continues until sixty days
after the woman gives birth. The child—having been born within the borders of the U.S.—is a citizen and
therefore eligible for continued Medicaid coverage. If the mother was not a citizen or permanent resident
before the birth of the baby, she so remains after giving birth; consequently, eight weeks after delivering,
she is no longer eligible for Medicaid and finds herself, once again, without health insurance.
39
Because the PCAP appointment day can be extremely lengthy, patients sometimes do not have the
opportunity to meet with the financial officer before the end of the business day. These patients are
instructed to meet with the financial officer whenever they are in the hospital during regular business hours,
e.g., at subsequent prenatal care appointments. The expectation is that all of the prenatal care patients seen
in the OB/GYN clinic will have Medicaid during their pregnancies. To meet this expectation—that is, to
identify all those patients that have somehow slipped through the cracks—several times throughout the day,
a financial officer makes the rounds through the Alpha Hospital OB/GYN clinic waiting room, asking
patients, “Do you have insurance? Are you pregnant?”
40
Proof of pregnancy is established by the submission of an Expected Date of Confinement [“EDC”]
Letter—a letter stating the woman’s projected delivery date, calculated based on the date of the woman’s
last menstrual period. This letter is usually given to the patient after she meets with the nurse. Proof of
identity may be established by the submission of a state driver’s license or ID card, school identification or
other photo identification, birth certificate, United States or foreign passport, or a permanent resident alien
card (“green card”). Proof of address may be established by the submission of a post-marked envelope,
utility bill, or rent receipt, complete with the patient’s home address and signature from the landlord.
Lastly, proof of income may be established by the submission of two pay stubs, a signed and dated letter
from the employer on company letterhead, or a 1040 form with wage statement. If, conversely, the patient
has no income, she must submit a “Letter of Support” with proof of address from the supporter. Alpha
Hospital, Frequently Asked Questions about Applying for PCAP (on file with author).
41
I established a rapport with one patient who was a Polish woman residing in the United States without
documentation. She tearfully approached me one day after meeting with the Medicaid Financial Officer,
showing me the list of the documents that she would have to submit in order to receive Medicaid coverage
for her prenatal care medical expenses. She said, “I don’t have these papers! It’s too complicated! Too
much!” I could only assure her that every patient with whom I had spoken had managed to get Medicaid
coverage, and I insisted that she would not be the exception.
42
One encounter with a patient underscored for me that the patient population of Alpha is largely
comprised of the underserved masses who supply cheap, often undocumented, labor to their enfranchised
counterparts. I was walking by an examination room in which a very pregnant woman with a bandage
around her wrist sat, waiting to be seen by a physician. She handed a cell phone to me and said, “Habla
español, ¿sí? Dígale en inglés.” “You speak Spanish, right? Tell her in English.” She then told me a
story in Spanish about how she was trying to clean the top of a bookshelf, but could not reach it. She found
a ladder, but even with the ladder’s help, she still could not reach the top of the bookshelf. Finally, she
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in such a situation must then acquire a letter from a person who she can claim financially
supports her—although she very well may financially support herself. Moreover, a
requirement as simple as establishing proof of address may be difficult for those patients
and families that have recently moved or expect to move within the upcoming weeks or
months. One patient explained to me that she had all the paperwork in order that she
needed—except for the proof of address; she had been staying with her sister and knew
that her tenure residing there would have to come to a close soon.
¶31
The Medicaid application process is an important part of the day for both the
pregnant woman seeking prenatal care and the hospital. For the patient, Medicaid
coverage means that she can receive healthcare during her pregnancy at no cost to her.
For the hospital, Medicaid coverage held by its pregnant patients means that the hospital
will not have to assume the loss created by patients who cannot pay the cost of services
rendered. As a public hospital and member of the New York City Health and Hospital
Commission, 43 Alpha Hospital is required by legislative mandate to provide services to
any patient who presents herself at the hospital. 44 Therefore, Medicaid coverage means
that the state and federal governments will reimburse the hospital for the cost of those
services it is required to provide anyway. Accordingly, it is in the hospital’s financial
interest to ensure that all the patients that it serves have Medicaid insurance.
¶32
Moreover, before the hospital can be reimbursed by the state for the services it
renders to patients with Medicaid, the hospital itself must be qualified as a “PCAP
provider”—meaning that the state has approved it to provide prenatal care services to
stood on a wet bar that was nearby, and, unfortunately, the corner of the bar on which she was standing
could not sustain her and broke under her weight. It took me a moment to realize that the patient wanted
me to translate this story to the person on the phone—someone who employed her as a housekeeper or
maid. I immediately went into advocacy mode and translated the story as sympathetically as I could for the
patient. I am not sure whether I saved the patient her job—the employer sounded irritated and only said to
me, “I don’t know how much it is going to cost to repair [the bar].” The precariousness of this patient’s
position in the world—being obliged to crawl on top of furniture during her last trimester in order to clean
the house of someone with whom she could not directly communicate, and sustaining an injury for which
no means were available to compensate her—resonated with me. That incident struck me with the
realization that Alpha is the place where the most exploited go when they have to “go to the doctor.”
43
The New York City Health and Hospitals Commission (NYCHHC) is a public benefit corporation,
created in 1970 for the purpose of overseeing New York City’s public health care system in all five
boroughs. “The Corporation consists of 11 acute care hospitals, 6 Diagnostic and Treatment Centers, 4
long-term care facilities, a certified home health care agency, and more than 80 community health clinics.
. . . Through its wholly owned subsidiary, MetroPlus, NYCHHC operates a Health Plan which enrolls
members in Medicaid, Child Health Plus, and Family Health Plus.” New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hhc/html/about/faq.shtml (last visited
Jan. 14, 2008).
44
A fact often quoted in Alpha Hospital pamphlets and advertisements is that “more than 80 percent of
Alpha’s patients come from the city’s medically underserved populations.” Alpha Hospital Fact Sheet (on
file with author). This fact is often followed by the statement: “No one in need is ever turned away from
Alpha.” That Alpha Hospital cannot refuse service to any patient who presents herself at the hospital is a
fact known by many patients that I have met while working behind the front desk of the OB/GYN clinic.
For example, one woman approached the front desk and said, “I’m pregnant. . . . I don’t have insurance. . . .
I need prenatal care. . . . Did I mention that I don’t have insurance?” In response, Minnie, a PCA who
frequently conducts intake behind the front desk, explained to her the PCAP process and how to begin it.
Coincidentally, I ran into the prospective patient that evening on my walk to the subway station. She
recognized me from the hospital, and we made polite conversation as we walked. Eventually, we began
talking about her pregnancy, and I asked her, “So, what made you come to Alpha for your prenatal care?”
She responded, “I was laid off from my job last month and I lost my health insurance. My friend told me
that I should go to Alpha because they have to see you. Even if you don’t have any health insurance, they
have to see you. They can’t turn you away.”
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Medicaid recipients. 45 And Medicaid Policy Guidelines mandate that a patient meet with
a nurse, nutritionist, HIV counselor, social worker, and a Medicaid financial officer. 46
That is, in order for the hospital to be reimbursed through Medicaid for the prenatal
services that it provides, it must guarantee that the patient meets with the above
professionals. Hence, the entire apparatus described above is mandated by the state. The
state essentially says to poor pregnant women, “We will pay your bills in exchange for, at
the very least, state surveillance of your pregnant body and the private arena in which it
exists.” It is quite an exchange to make—considering that women with private insurance
are not similarly compelled to cede access to their private lives. Indeed, government
subsidization of medical service becomes a kind of recruitment device that enlists poor
women into the welfare bureaucracy’s subjection. Again, some may find state
intervention into women’s private lives completely unproblematic and potentially
desirable—understanding it as a laudable effort to provide pregnant women with a wealth
of information that they could use to make their pregnancies healthy events on multiple
levels. 47 However, it is not all women whose private lives are intervened upon; indeed, it
45

“A PCAP provider is an Article 28 approved hospital outpatient department or freestanding diagnostic
and treatment center (D&TC) that was approved by the NYSDOH to provide prenatal care in accordance
with Part 85.40 of Public Health Law at 10 NYCRR.” OFFICE OF MEDICAID MGMT., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH, PRENATAL CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (PCAP): MEDICAID POLICY GUIDELINES MANUAL 3
(2007) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. “If the application review process indicates the provider is qualified and
the Department approves their enrollment, the provider is reimbursed at an enhanced Medicaid rate for the
enriched package of services delivered.” Id. at 4.
46
The Guidelines explicitly delineate that all PCAP providers must provide “[n]utrition services including
referral to the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Program, [p]sychosocial services, HIV counseling and
testing, [p]renatal diagnostic and treatment services, [h]ealth education, [and s]creening for presumptive
eligibility for Medicaid and assisting pregnant women complete the Medicaid application process.” Id. at
3.
47
Indeed, this is the rationale given by some of the Alpha Hospital employees who actually provide the
services mandated by the state. Social worker Tina enthusiastically describes her job as that of providing
valuable services to women who need them. She argues that pregnancy might be an ideal time to make
interventions in women’s lives. She says, “There may be child abuse, sexual abuse, domestic violence.
For a woman in an abusive relationship, she could be raped by her spouse and wind up pregnant. The
pregnancy is a good reason to leave the house and come to the hospital. For a woman in that situation, this
[the meeting with the social worker] could be an opportunity to get help.” Interview with anonymous
social worker (Jan. 2007). Even for women “without issues,” the social worker thought her role remained
important and useful nevertheless, as she could ensure that women are connected with all the social
services of which they may avail themselves.
However, subsequent to all meetings with patients, Alpha Hospital employees must make a written
notation inside the patient’s medical record of the topics discussed. Upon review of these notations, it is
difficult to squelch skepticism towards optimistic articulations that Medicaid-mandated services are
provided for the benefit of the woman alone. A common notation reads as follows:
Information delivered: 1st Trimester: orientation to facility, rights/responsibilities of pregnant
patient, pregnancy danger signs, common discomforts, drugs/ETOH/smoking OTC drugs,
enrolled in WIC, occupational concerns, contacts after clinic hours (emergency), domestic
violence, toxoplasmosis[;] 2nd trimester: pregnancy danger signs, common discomforts,
sexuality, fetal movement, physical activity/exercise, signs/symptoms pre-term labor.
Patient Response: PT VERBALIZED UNDERSTANDING.
Another example from a patient’s encounter with the “Breastfeeding Teaching Protocol”: Within
this protocol, the nurse is required to articulate to the patient the benefits of breastfeeding—among them,
“economic, convenience, safety, health . . ., nutrition[al], immunity, [and] development[al]” benefits. The
“outcome” of the meeting: “The patient will verbalize commitment and desire to meet her infant’s
nutritional and nurturing needs via breastfeeding.” Alpha Hospital Breastfeeding Teaching Protocol (on
file with author). Indeed, all documentation of employee meetings with patients is punctuated with a
statement attesting to the fact that the patient verbalized an understanding of, or commitment to follow, the
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is only poor, uninsured women’s private lives that are rendered accessible to state
intervention, regulation, and management. As a consequence, Medicaid coverage of
prenatal care could be construed as a carrot that attracts poor women into the state
regulatory apparatus.
¶33
Furthermore, even if a woman has no interest in applying for Medicaid—opting to
use her own private insurance or pay out-of-pocket for her prenatal care 48 —she must still
meet with the nutritionist, social worker, HIV counselor, and nurse before being
scheduled to see a provider for a medical examination. This policy is effected because
the hospital chooses to err on the side of fiscal caution—presuming that every patient
receiving healthcare within the obstetrics clinic will eventually become a Medicaid
recipient. In the event that a patient ultimately receives Medicaid coverage, the hospital
can be reimbursed for the services it provides—as it has satisfied all the PCAP
requirements for Medicaid reimbursement for that patient. Alternatively, in the event that
the patient ultimately does not receive Medicaid coverage and, instead, pays for prenatal
services through private insurance or out-of-pocket, the hospital is not disadvantaged in
any way; the only consequence would be that the PCAP services would have been
rendered unnecessarily. As a result, all Alpha Hospital pregnant patients—without
regard to whether they receive Medicaid—are compelled to expose themselves to state
information delivered.
An observer with a healthy dose of skepticism could reasonably understand these notations as doing
nothing more than offering written proof that the hospital provided the meeting pursuant to the
requirements of Medicaid. Indeed, if the services were provided for the benefit of the woman alone, there
might be no reason to document that they, in fact, were delivered; as long as the pregnant woman received
the information, then the hospital’s mission would be accomplished. Or, documentation that the patient
verbalized understanding or commitment might be read as protecting the hospital from future litigation
initiated by the woman. For example, a woman who smokes cigarettes during her pregnancy and
subsequently gives birth to a low birth-weight baby would have a difficult time suing the hospital for
failing to inform her about the causal relationship between smoking and birth weight if she had “verbalized
understanding” about the matter early on in her pregnancy. The same might be said about a range of other
issues that endanger the health of the fetus.
Remarkably, this skepticism about the hospital’s program is shared by some Alpha employees. On
one occasion, I saw a patient’s medical record sitting on a chair in one of the triage rooms. I picked it up
and, noticing its volume, remarked to one of the nurses in the room, “It’s so thick! That’s a lot of
paperwork.” She said, “You know why, right? Litigation. Patients can’t sue us.”
48
As stated earlier, I met only one uninsured patient who, because her income exceeded the income
limitations set by Medicaid, elected to pay for her healthcare out of her own pocket and to receive prenatal
care from Alpha Hospital. Moreover, I never met a patient who had private insurance, yet nevertheless
elected to receive her prenatal care at Alpha Hospital. However, one of the midwives informed me that she
had encountered some Alpha patients who had private insurance, yet chose to apply for and receive
Medicaid because their private insurance required exorbitant co-payments. As an example, she offered the
experience of her friend, whose private insurance required a co-payment of over $3,000 for her labor and
delivery expenses. She explained that some patients are similarly-situated and therefore elect Medicaid
coverage in order to avoid the astronomical out-of-pocket expenses that are attendant with some private
insurance.
Interestingly, the midwife related this story to me as an illustration of how the “system” does not
work. That patients may have private insurance, yet receive Medicaid reimbursement for medical expenses
nevertheless, was offered as a case in point of a shortcoming of the welfare state. Yet, patients who elect to
receive Medicaid in order to avoid excessive private insurance co-payments seem, to me, to be
underinsured. Medicaid should be available to those whose private insurance fails to sufficiently cover the
costs of their medical expenses. In other words, the example given by the midwife should not be
understood as a failure or abuse of the welfare state; rather, it ought to be understood as one of its successes
insofar as it enables women with insufficient and inadequate private insurance to bear their prenatal care
expenses.
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intervention, regulation, and management by providing information about the minutiae of
their private, intimate spheres.
¶34
To distill the central theme of the above exposition: for the uninsured poor, state
regulation is simultaneous with prenatal care. Foucault’s theorization of the carceral is
helpful in understanding the significance of this fact. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
argued that the classical-era scaffold, which could demonstrate the immense power of the
sovereign only by destroying the body of the prisoner, was replaced by the instrument of
the modern-era prison—the consummate vehicle for acting on the heart, thoughts, will,
and inclinations of the prisoner. It produced docile bodies through a technique that
combines constant surveillance with the precise management of the prisoner’s body in
space—both physical and temporal. The Panoptican, the prison par excellence,
dramatized and epitomized the operation of power in the modern age: the prisoner, whose
body is always capable of being seen, bears this knowledge and, in turn, becomes the
agent of his own discipline and oppression.
¶35
In the final chapter of this seminal tome, Foucault explained that the work
accomplished by the prison has been disseminated to a range of institutions:
[M]oving still farther from penality in the strict sense, the carceral circles
widen and the form of the prison slowly diminished and finally disappears
altogether: the institutions for abandoned or indigent children, the
orphanages . . ., the establishments for apprentices. . . . And then, still
farther, there was a whole series of mechanisms that did not adopt the
“compact” prison-model, but used some of the carceral methods:
charitable societies, moral improvement associations, organizations that
handed out assistance and also practiced surveillance, workers’ estates and
lodging houses . . . . 49
¶36

The result of this dissemination was the creation of a “carceral archipelago,” which
“transported [the technique of the prison] from the penal institution to the entire social
body.” 50 Indeed, “this great carceral network reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms
that function throughout society.” 51 Thus, bodies incarcerated in penal institutions are
not the only bodies subjected to constant surveillance and management, performed with
the intent to “correct” the desires of the subject; rather, all bodies caught within the
“carceral net”—usually indigent, disenfranchised, and importantly, female (a point,
unfortunately, ignored by Foucault)—are thus subjected.
¶37
In this way, one can understand Medicaid coverage of prenatal care as an apparatus
that attracts poor, pregnant subjects into the carceral archipelago. That the state pays the
medical bills accrued by pregnant women for their prenatal care is benign, in and of
itself; however, the endeavor appears more disciplinary and surveillance-intensive when
one considers that the state first requires the woman to meet with a nutritionist (who
constructs a chart quantifying, and frequently censuring, her diet), an HIV-counselor
(who attempts to gain her consent to an HIV-antibody test, the results of which will most
assuredly be sent to the proper authorities and become the stuff of citywide, statewide,
49

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 298 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
Id.
51
Id.
50
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and nationwide statistics), a social worker (who compels the women to divulge intimate
details about her life), as well as nurses, health educators, and financial officers. All of
this is to say, the pregnant woman who has decided to attempt prenatal care at a public
hospital like Alpha finds herself most decidedly within the state apparatus. 52
¶38
In sum, the fact of pregnancy alone does not bring a woman within the jurisdiction
of the state. Yet, the fact of pregnancy combined with the woman’s attempted receipt of
state aid not only brings a woman within the state’s jurisdiction, but also becomes an
opportunity for the state to create a legal subject whose private life is exposed to state
supervision and surveillance. In this way, Medicaid and PCAP programs function to
create legal subjects of pregnant women—bringing them within the jurisdiction of the
biopolitical state, making them and previously invisible (some would say “private”)
elements of their lives visible, exposing them to state oversight, and ultimately baring
them to the potentiality of state-sanctioned violence. 53
IV.
¶39

BODY MATTERS: THE PRODUCTION 54 OF “UNRULY BODIES”

I have hoped to demonstrate that attempting prenatal care with the assistance of
state aid initiates women into an expansive state regulatory apparatus that far exceeds the
purview of that care. This is significant because it demonstrates how class operates to
differentially produce populations—generating the poor (not infrequently composed of
people of color) as a group whose private lives are not respected as spheres into which
the state ought not to tread. 55 Additionally, the simultaneity of prenatal care and state
management, intervention, and oversight is also significant because Medicaid coverage
arguably produces the bodies of poor women—as a class—as problematic entities. That
is, Medicaid coverage produces poor, pregnant women as possessors of unruly bodies.
52

Notably, the male partners of women attempting prenatal care at a public hospital like Alpha also find
themselves decidedly within the state apparatus. This is because the nurses taking the initial medical
history and social workers seek to elicit information about the fathers of patients’ babies. Accordingly,
after a woman has been thoroughly interviewed by the social worker, she would have identified the father
of her baby, his telephone number and address, his race and citizenship status, his place of employment and
salary, whether he is supportive of the pregnancy, and if he has ever abused her physically or otherwise.
Hence, women’s extraordinary visibility before state authorities effects the extraordinary visibility of the
males with whom they have relationships.
53
By “state-sanctioned violence,” I refer to violent acts committed by the state—acts that are only
understood as legitimate because they are perpetrated by the government through “legal” means. So
defined, I view the ability of the state via ACS to demand entrance into a woman’s home and survey its
contents as an act of state-sanctioned violence.
Moreover, I view the ability of the state to take custody of a woman’s children as a gross act of
state-sanctioned violence. I spoke with a postpartum patient who recounted an example of this unfortunate
demonstration of state-sanctioned violence: When she went into labor, she brought her two children—ages
seven and twelve—with her to the hospital. However, because no other adults were present with her, and
because minors are not allowed entrance into the Alpha Hospital delivery rooms, her five year-old and
twelve year-old were placed in a foster home while she delivered. It was only after she was discharged
from the hospital that she able to regain physical custody of her children. Interview with anonymous
obstetrics clinic patient (Nov. 2006).
54
See supra Part I for a discussion of the use of “production” and “produce” in this context.
55
A related question is whether the Medicaid-enabled intrusion by the state into poor women’s private lives
merely demonstrates how socioeconomic class produces a population whose privacy rights are nullified by
state interference. Or rather, does it demonstrate how the state is directly and actively involved in
producing class inequalities and subjugation, generating a population with no privacy rights that the state is
bound to respect? I intend to explore this question in a later piece.
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To begin, Medicaid coverage produces the pregnant body in a very specific, highlymedicalized way. Per the protocol that PCAP providers must follow, the pregnant body
whose prenatal expenses are paid by the state is one that:
(1) Should be monitored every three weeks during the first two trimesters, every
two weeks during the first two months of the last trimester, and every week
during the final month of pregnancy; should be weighed at every visit to the
clinic, and the body’s blood pressure ratio should be measured and recorded;
(2) Can benefit from prescribed prenatal vitamins;
(3) Requires the visualization of its interiority via ultrasound between twelve and
twenty-four weeks, a procedure during which all parts of fetal anatomy are
identified, amniotic fluid levels are checked, and other physical abnormalities
which can be seen, e.g., placenta previa, vasa previa, are detected;
(4) Demands urine testing for glucose and albumin at each visit;
(5) Should be given a “Group B streptococcus culture at 35-37 weeks, as
indicated per the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
guidelines”; 56
(6) Should be hailed back to the clinic within eight weeks after giving birth in
order to be given a final medical exam, be assessed for any additional
“medical, psychosocial, nutritional, alcohol treatment and drug treatment
needs of the mother or infant that are not being met,” 57 and be given
information on family planning and/or actual contraception if the preferred
method has been identified;
(7) Should be given a referral enabling the woman’s enrollment in WIC; 58
(8) Requires the “glucose challenge test” at the woman’s initial visit and again at
28 weeks, which necessitates the woman having her blood drawn, then
consuming a sugary beverage (“Glu-cola”) and having her blood drawn three
more times every subsequent hour in order to test how well the woman’s
body metabolizes glucose, and as a consequence, whether the body is
diabetic;
56

The creation of a requirement from a guideline proposed by the CDC should dispel any doubts that the
pregnant patients at Alpha Hospital reside squarely within the state’s biopolitical project. The prevention
and control of epidemic and pandemic health threats to the population, which is the concern of the CDC, is
practiced on the bodies of the individuals within the obstetrics clinic at Alpha. Said differently, the
individual bodies within the hospital become the stuff upon which the state can act on the population. To
borrow an argument made by Duden in a different, but related, context: The enactment of CDC guidelines
on an individual is to apply a policy that “make[s] sense only for groups”—insofar as it is done with the
health of the population, and not the woman, in mind. She, consequently, “is transformed into a crumb of
the population.” DUDEN, supra note 8, at 18.
I do not argue that Medicaid-recipients are transformed into “crumbs of the population” while their
privately-insured counterparts wholly escape such transformation. This is because screening for Group B
streptococcus at thirty-five to thirty-seven weeks gestation has become the standard of care, meaning that
all providers of obstetrical care are encouraged to screen their patients for the infection.
57
GUIDELINES, supra note 45, at 14.
58
In fact, the Guidelines presume that all women submitting themselves to PCAP services should be
enrolled in WIC. In the description of the PCAP program, the Guidelines include within the list of
“comprehensive services that are included in the enhanced Medicaid clinic visit rate . . . [n]utrition services
including referral to the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Program.” Id. at 3. It should be noted that
the Guidelines do not specify that this referral is “as needed” or “as indicated”; instead, it is a blanket
referral given to all women seeking Medicaid coverage of prenatal care services.
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(9) Should be given a “repeat gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis and HIV screen
during the third trimester, as clinically indicated,” and once again at the postpartum visit; and
(10) Should be vaccinated for Hepatitis B and screened for tuberculosis.
¶41

Items one through five of the above list are not particular to Medicaid-subsidized
prenatal care; the privately-insured should expect similar treatment. The rest of the items
differ from the care given to privately-insured patients in the following ways:
(1) While privately-insured women commonly receive a medical examination six
to eight weeks after giving birth, their doctors do not assess their
“psychosocial, nutritional, alcohol and drug treatment needs” unless given a
reason to do so; neither do I expect that providers attending to privatelyinsured patients provide information on contraceptives to women at their
postpartum visits—that is, unless women specifically request it;
(2) Women with private insurance most likely will not receive a referral for
WIC;
(3) Administration of the “glucose challenge test” at the woman’s initial prenatal
care visit and again at twenty-eight weeks is reserved for Medicaid recipients.
The privately-insured receive the test only once, when they are twenty-eight
weeks pregnant; 59
(4) While all pregnant women—with or without private insurance—should
expect a test for gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis during the Pap smear that
they receive during their initial prenatal care visit, only Medicaid-recipients
are tested for these sexually-transmitted diseases again during their third
trimester, and once again during their post-partum visit; 60 and
(5) The privately-insured are not commonly vaccinated for Hepatitis B or
screened for tuberculosis.

¶42

Nevertheless, the general structure of privately-insured women’s prenatal care does
not greatly diverge from that of women with Medicaid; frequent doctor’s visits during
which the body and its functions are measured, examined, and manipulated within sterile,
59

I never received a satisfying explanation as to why Alpha patients were doubly administered the glucose
challenge test. All of the providers to whom I posed the question were similarly perplexed by the protocol
requiring the test for women at their first visits to the clinic. One attending physician responded, “I don’t
know why they do it here. It’s not really valid. If it’s positive, you can’t call it gestational diabetes because
they’re not even eight weeks pregnant. I think they do it early here because of compliance problems. They
also do it because a lot of people are borderline diabetic before their pregnancies. But, out in the real
world, they don’t do it.” Interview with anonymous attending physician (Aug. 2007).
60
Most of the Alpha providers with whom I spoke knew that Alpha patients were screened for these
sexually-transmitted pathogens more than their private insurance-holding counterparts. However, most
insisted that they were comfortable with the protocol because the “patient population” at Alpha is purported
to be at a higher risk for sexually-transmitted diseases. One nurse practitioner elaborated that she found no
ethical dilemma with repeating these tests, which require vaginal examinations, because she would be
conducting vaginal examinations at those times anyway—at thirty-six weeks gestation for the Group B
streptococcus culture, and at six weeks postpartum to check the health of the cervix. The provider that
most closely approximated outrage over this policy was a physician in the second year of his residency. He
stated, with some degree of distaste, “They have a gonorrhea/chlamydia screen when they first come here.
Then, they have another one done at 36 weeks. So, why do they need one now—six weeks after delivery?
It’s silly.” Interview with anonymous second-year resident (Apr. 2007).
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white-walled spaces are as common for wealthier pregnant women with private insurance
as they are for women with Medicaid. Hence, I do not argue that the course of general
treatment mandated by Medicaid is altogether unique to government-subsidized
insurance or that it is otherwise reserved for poor, uninsured women. Thus, I do not
contrast the Medicaid-mandated regime of care with that regularly offered to and
accepted by most private insurance-holders. Rather, I contrast the Medicaid-mandated
regime of care with that which is not available to Medicaid-recipients: prenatal care
offered within a paradigm that does not understand pregnancy as always and necessarily
a medical event. 61 That is, while women with private insurance may elect to receive
prenatal care that is premised on the constant surveillance and measurement of the
pregnant body, women with Medicaid do not make such an election; it is elected by the
state on their behalf.
61

I compare the Medicaid-mandated course of treatment with the experience of Kamilah, a woman with
private insurance that I interviewed two weeks after she had given birth at her home to her third child:
Khiara: So, did you have to go to, like, a clinic for your prenatal care appointments?
Kamilah: For my appointments? No, I just went to [my midwife’s] home.
Khiara: So, you never had to go into a medicalized environment?
Kamilah: Well, I went to a clinic the first couple of times. And when she referred me for
sonograms, I did that. But, other than that, it was either in her home office or in my house. It’s
great because in your last month . . . .
Khiara: Because you have to go more often.
Kamilah: Yeah, more often. Thirty weeks—once you pass that, it’s twice a month. And once
you’re thirty-six weeks, weekly. And those weekly visits, she comes to you. Partly to
familiarize herself with your home. I mean, she knows my stuff because this is her third [child
that she has delivered in my home]. But, you know, [she comes to your home in order] to
familiarize herself with your home. And also, so that you don’t stress getting to her. So, we had
our visits here.
Interview with privately-insured new mother (Jan. 2006). Kamilah did not recall being weighed at every
visit with her midwife—especially the weekly visits that she had during the last month of her pregnancy.
Neither did she recall having her blood pressure taken repeatedly. While her urine was tested for the
presence of glucose and albumin at every prenatal care appointment, Kamilah herself would do the testing
by dipping a pH stick into urine that she had collected; she reported to the midwife whether the pH stick
revealed anything abnormal. Kamilah was never prescribed prenatal vitamins; rather, her midwife
recommended a vegan prenatal vitamin that she could take if she felt that she was not consuming healthy
amounts of the recommended foods. Additionally, Kamilah reports that her midwife did, in fact, conduct a
vaginal examination during the thirty-sixth week of her pregnancy; but, she denies that she was tested once
again for sexually-transmitted infections during that examination. Id.
Kamilah gave birth to her third child in her bedroom while her two young children slept. Her labor
and delivery represented the final episode of an ideology of pregnancy as an event that need not be
sequestered away into sterile environments. Rather, it was treated as an occasion that can and should be
built into the fabric of a woman’s extant life. Notably, Kamilah does not describe herself as “antimedicine” or avow the outright rejection of medicine. When I asked Kamilah if she was “opposed to
medicine,” she said, “I’m opposed to unnecessary medicine . . . . But, I’m not one of those people who
would be dying, talking about, ‘No, I don’t want the surgery.’ You know? But, I don’t even take aspirin. I
feel like, if you have a headache, get to the root of the headache . . . . Like, around here, we do herb tea and
just natural tinctures and that sort of thing. When we’re dealing with a fever—especially with the kids—
usually we do fevergrass for it. But if it’s bad—I don’t know if you remember what it’s like to have a
fever: the headache and just everything hurts. Just to relieve them, I’ll give them some IB Motrin. Within
reason. Within reason. I think that we’re an overly-medicated society. So, I’m kind of careful about that.”
Id.
Kamilah—and probably more than a few public insurance-holding women, if given the option—
preferred to receive a course of treatment that refuses to understand pregnancy as an ailment and that
simultaneously empowers the pregnant woman to care for her own body.
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Women receiving Medicaid cannot enjoy prenatal care delivered outside of a
paradigm of pregnancy as a medical event requiring medical intervention. The prenatal
healthcare provided by Medicaid, by statutory mandate, is premised on constant
surveillance of the pregnant body—a body whose health appears to be capable of failing
at any given moment. This is in line with what medical anthropologist Robbie DavisFloyd termed the “technocratic model of childbirth”—within which “the female body is
viewed as an abnormal, unpredictable, and inherently defective machine.” 62 I would like
to expand Davis-Floyd’s argument to encompass the nine months that precede labor and
childbirth; hence, I argue that the regime of prenatal care described above is a function of
a “technocratic model of pregnancy”; accordingly, Davis-Floyd’s “technocratic model of
childbirth” would represent the final stage of a larger ideology of the pregnant body. It is
a body whose ability to process sugar may suddenly disappoint, whose blood pressure
may dangerously climb, and whose weight gain (or lack thereof) may indicate some
unspecified complication. It is a body that is deficient in nutrients, for both itself and the
body of the fetus that it carries within; hence, prenatal vitamins are prescribed to it, and it
is enrolled in WIC to enable its acquisition of “iron-fortified adult cereal, vitamin C-rich
fruit or vegetable juice, eggs, milk, cheese, peanut butter, dried beans/peas, tuna fish and
carrots.” 63 It is one that is always already susceptible to pathogens in the form of bacteria
and viruses; hence, it must be screened for their presence. Indeed, the pregnant body
produced by Medicaid is so greatly susceptible to sexually-transmitted pathogens (i.e.,
gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis, and HIV) that it must be doubly screened for their
presence during pregnancy, and once again six weeks after the woman gives birth. The
body produced by Medicaid is one whose interior should be made visible to the naked
eye via technological interventions;64 subsequent thereto, women are rewarded with fuzzy
black-and-white images of their insides. 65 Lastly, the look of the place should not be
62

Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, The Technocractic Body: American Childbirth as Cultural Expression, 38 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 1125, 1127 (1994).
63
WIC FACT SHEET, supra note 20, at 2.
64
Interestingly, many of Alpha patients’ interiors are made visible via ultrasound several times over the
course of their pregnancies. This is because, invariably, the fetus is not in a position within the uterus that
enables the ultrasound technician to acquire images of all relevant parts of the anatomy. Accordingly, if the
technician cannot acquire a satisfactory image of, say, the fetus’ femur, the woman must return to the clinic
to have a re-scan. Additionally, if there is a discrepancy between the woman’s asserted date of last
menstrual period (LMP) and the size of the fetus as indicated by the ultrasound, the woman must return to
the clinic to have a “growth scan”—during which the technician determines how much the fetus has grown
between the growth scan and the previous scan: If the sonogram indicates that the fetus is smaller or larger
than it should be based on its LMP, the physicians and technicians have to determine whether the LMP is
incorrect or if there is a problem with the fetus. For example, it would have to be determined whether a
small fetus is really 12 weeks gestational age as opposed to the 16 weeks that it would be based on the date
of the woman’s LMP, or if, alternatively, the 16 week-old fetus is just abnormally small. Most of the time,
the woman has simply miscalculated the date of her last menstrual period and there is nothing wrong with
the fetus. Nevertheless, I can imagine the anxiety produced in a woman who is told preliminarily, “Your
fetus is too small.”
The result of suboptimal fetal positioning and LMP discrepancies is that patients find themselves
with several ultrasound scans over the course of their pregnancies. This may serve to reiterate woman’s
dependency on medical technology as well as the fact of the “unruliness” of their bodies. I discuss this
notion of the “unruly body” later on in this section of the paper.
65
Although I endeavor to problematize the staggering and ostentatious technology—including ultrasound
imaging—that is used to manage women’s pregnancies as a matter of course inside of Alpha Hospital, I
would be remiss if I neglected to report that many of the patients with whom I have spoken absolutely
adore the fuzzy black-and-white images of their fetuses with which they are rewarded after their ultrasound
scans. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of
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disregarded: that is, the Medicaid-produced pregnant body is one that is appropriately
treated in antiseptic examination rooms by physicians, nurse practitioners, and midwives
who wear white lab coats. 66 This body should be led down white-walled, white-tiled
corridors by gloved and uniform-wearing medical assistants. 67 The body should be
exposed, unavoidably, to the smell of disinfectants, cleaning solutions, sanitizers, and
sterilizers.
¶44
In essence, the body produced by Medicaid is one that is insistently and tenaciously
medically managed. While one can make a persuasive argument that the course of
treatment mandated by Medicaid exceeds “normal” medicalization insofar as Medicaid
Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD, AND MEDICINE 57, 72 (M.
Stanworth ed., 1987) (“Women frequently enjoy seeing pictures of their fetuses, citing that it creates a
feeling of intimacy, as well as a sense of predictability and control”). At Alpha, the ultrasound technicians
usually give the women at least two images of the profiles of their fetuses’ faces. While I found many of
the ultrasound images indecipherable, I could usually relate the fuzzy images of a fetus’ profile with that of
a baby; but see id. at 62 (“[T]he photographic image . . . obscures the fact that that image is heavily
constructed.”). I have been present on numerous occasions when women create a scene of sorts when they
are told by the technician that they would not be receiving ultrasound pictures, usually because the fetus
was not in a suitable position for its profile to be “photographed.” Additionally, I know many women who
have created photo albums from their sonogram pictures and several women who have put the ultrasound
images of their fetuses on their cell phones as screensavers. Nevertheless, patients’ joy in the acquisition
and possession of ultrasound images should not serve to diminish the critique of fetal imaging, nor should it
serve to mitigate the critique of the high (some would say excessive) amount of technology that is used to
manage all women’s pregnancies at Alpha. As Petchesky noted, women’s ways of seeing their ultrasound
images may be affected by public images of fetuses. Id. at 73. Similarly, patients’ excitement over their
ultrasound images, and enthusiasm about the medical management of their pregnancies, is far from a
“natural” response; rather, it is a response that is a product of a culture (perhaps coinciding with what can
be identified as a “U.S. culture”) that, for the most part, fetishizes the fetus and venerates medical science.
On the latter point, see LESLEY A. SHARP, STRANGE HARVEST: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, DENATURED BODIES,
AND THE TRANSFORMED SELF 238 (Univ. Cal. Press 2006) (discussing Eleni Papagaroufali’s study of
perceptions about organ transfer in Greece, and noting that Papagaroufali was “struck especially by how
readily Americans embrace biotechnological answers as solutions to human suffering,” and observing that
“Greeks, in contrast, are far less committed to this paradigm, given that their nation remains peripheral to
the scientific realm, one whose values are otherwise deeply entrenched in American society.”).
66
One of the first observations that I made upon beginning fieldwork in the OB/GYN clinic at Alpha
Hospital was how simple it was to identify a staff member with his/her occupation in the clinic. The staff is
structured according to the following hierarchy: The medical assistants are the women of color who wear
beige nursing uniforms. (Indeed, all of the medical assistants are women of color.) The women of color
who wear white lab coats are the registered nurses. (Again, all of the registered nurses are women of
color.) The residents are the relatively young persons, usually White, who wear white lab coats. The nurse
practitioners and midwives are more easily confused; they are all young, White, well-dressed women who
do not wear lab coats. Finally, attending physicians are the older persons who wear white lab coats. The
exception to this schema is the lone male midwife, Mark—an older, stately gentleman who opts to wear a
white lab coat. Had I not had the pleasure of meeting Mark on my first day at the clinic and having a long,
enjoyable conversation during which he described his occupation and background, I would have wrongly
assumed—due to his age, gender, and lab coat—that he was an attending physician.
67
Biologist Lynda Birke has written thought-provoking work regarding how standard practices of Western
medicine—including the look of the facilities in which Western medicine is dispensed—may alienate
women of color. She writes, “In hospitals particularly, whiteness can seem to predominate . . . which, in
the experience of one patient, felt at odds with her black identity. White is the colour (or its lack) of
hospital spaces (and thence represents the disempowerment of the patient in the hospital bed, especially if
she is not white).” LYNDA BIRKE, FEMINISM AND THE BIOLOGICAL BODY 82 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2000).
Birke’s observation reveals a glaring absence from the present discussion thus far; that is, an explicit
analysis of the role of race in the Alpha obstetrics clinic is conspicuously absent. But, I have not yet
worked through the problem of how race complicates what has been presented here as an issue of class. I
am still struggling with how to answer the question of how patients’ races engage with the above-described
state/Medicaid apparatus and the biomedical delivery of prenatal care.
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recipients are doubly and trebly tested for conditions for which the private-insured are
screened only once, that is not my interest. I believe that even if one assumes, for
argument’s sake, that Medicaid-recipients’ prenatal care is not medicalized beyond the
extent to which privately-insured women’s care is medicalized, the intersection of this
“normal” medicalization with a population entirely composed of poor women generates
especially disempowering effects. In the following section, I discuss Barbara Duden’s
scholarship on the fetus and her critique of the medicalization of pregnancy, generally. I
then explore her critique in the context of the poor women that it affects at Alpha
Hospital.
A.

The Dudenian Fetus

¶45

The possibilities and problems associated with the biomedical paradigm of
pregnancy are invariably at work in the Alpha Hospital obstetrics clinic. The
understanding of the pregnant body within biomedical discourse has been convincingly
described as disempowering to the woman upon whom it is enacted. Historian Barbara
Duden’s work in this area is instructive. She argues that women’s experiences of
pregnancy in the modern era are held hostage by the “fetus”—a biological fact that is
taken to be best administered within the biomedical paradigm. A woman’s fetus,
however, is only accessible to her via technological processes that are held in monopoly
by medical professionals. Thus, the fetus “disembodies” a woman’s perceptions and
“forces her into a nine-month clientage in which her ‘scientifically’ defined needs for
help and counsel are addressed by professionals.” 68 Duden compares this experience of
pregnancy with those of women who have been protected from the “fetus” by historical
happenstance and/or their subordinated socioeconomic positioning within global
capitalism. She describes the pregnancy of the mother of a poor, recent immigrant living
in Harlem as much more “sensual, warm, touchable, familiar.” 69 Pregnancy—before the
advent of photogenically-produced fetuses and tests that can detect the presence of
Human Chorionic Gonadotropic [HCG] hormone—was a more embodied, personal
event. Knowledge of it resided with the woman who sensed it; further, a woman’s
pregnancy was only made known to others through her announcement of it. Duden
argues that “the fetus” has altered this. Pregnancy was once an intensely intimate, bodily
event about which the pregnant woman knows best—a publicly recognized, haptic state
of woman known essentially through her testimony. 70 It is now a condition that
professionals first confirm, then manage, for a woman.
¶46
On the issue of tests that can detect the presence of the HCG hormone in urine and,
therefore, determine the fact of a woman’s pregnancy, Duden writes: “Today when I do
not get my menstrual period, I wait a week, perhaps a few days more. Then I face a
decision. I can cross a historically unprecedented threshold and enter the world of
scientific ‘facts’ by obtaining a kit for a urine test. Seeing the result, I conjure up a fetus,
and with it the abstraction ‘life.’” 71 She then goes on to say that once the fetus is thus
conjured, submission to the biomedical establishment closely follows. Duden’s narrative
68

DUDEN, supra note 8, at 4.
Id. at 27.
70
Id. at 81.
71
Id. at 53.
69
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about the closure of the universe of possibilities a woman can imagine about her
pregnancy and pregnant body upon the acquisition of a “kit for a urine test” is
particularly relevant at Alpha Hospital. Indeed, a caricature of Duden’s scenario is
performed numerous times a day at the obstetrics clinic: Prospective prenatal patients
must submit urine to be tested for HCG in order to begin the PCAP process at Alpha—
this despite the fact that the large majority of prospective patients have already confirmed
their pregnancies with at-home urine pregnancy tests prior to setting foot inside of Alpha.
Accordingly, if Duden is correct in that the performance of a urine pregnancy test
inscribes women within a specific model of pregnancy and the “fetus,” then Alpha’s
requirement of its repetition serves to reinscribe and reiterate this model and its power. It
educates women about the nature of the enterprise (i.e., one that is scientific and
medicalized) into which they are entering by receiving their prenatal care from Alpha.
¶47
In sum, Duden’s argument is that a woman, now, must depend on technicallytrained professionals to care for her during an event that she is intellectually and
technically unprepared to manage for herself. Thus, pregnant women are disempowered
and made dependent. 72
B.

The Dudenian Fetus at Alpha

¶48

Duden’s argument is applicable to all women living within the era of the fetus.
Accordingly, all women, without regard to class, would be equally disempowered and
equally made dependent. However, I would like to extend her critique to the women that
it affects in Alpha Hospital—poor women. That is, a poor woman may experience the
disempowering and dependency-producing effects of a medically-managed pregnancy as
yet another demonstration of her powerlessness within society. Indeed, prenatal care so
delivered may be understood as a disciplinary mechanism that educates poor women
about their status within society and the behavior expected of those that so occupy that
station. Specifically, being poor is about being dependent on others, about submitting
oneself to surveillance, about being problematized. Being poor is about putting oneself
within the charge of someone who can meet the needs that one lacks the ability to satisfy
for oneself.
¶49
Indeed, for non-poor women, the element of choice may temper the effects of the
disempowering aspects of the Dudenian fetus and the concomitant medical management
of pregnancy. Duden speaks of electing to put oneself within the charge of medical
72

Davis-Floyd describes the “technocratic model of childbirth” as similarly disempowering. She argues
that standard procedures during medically-managed childbirths “enact the view that the female bodymachine is inherently defective and generally incapable of producing perfect babies without technological
assistance from professionals.” Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Obstetric Training as a Rite of Passage, 1 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 288, 292 (1987). Upon a woman’s admittance to the hospital, she is shaved, given an
enema, dressed in a hospital gown, and tagged with an identification wristband. This, she says,
“symbolically strip[s her] of her individuality, her autonomy, and her sexuality.” Id. at 293. Moreover,
“the internal monitor, attached through electrodes to the baby’s scalp, communicates the additional
message that the baby-as-hospital-product is in potential danger from the inherent defectiveness of the
mother’s birthing machine.” Id. Finally, the physical posture that the woman is compelled to assume
during labor, the lithotomy position, puts the woman in a position of “complete exposure, expressing and
reinforcing her powerlessness and the power of society (as evidenced by its representative—the
obstetrician) at the supreme moment of her individual transformation.” Id. at 294. This experience as
described by Davis-Floyd might be understood as an unsurprising culmination—a concluding
demonstration—of nine months of dependency and disempowerment during prenatal care within the
biomedical model of pregnancy.
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professionals by accepting discursive constructions of the fetus. She argues that women
must “decide” whether to understand their pregnancies as the production of a fetus with
needs only medical science may satisfy. Alternatively, women may reject this fetus and
choose “aliveness”—a presumably more sensuous, corporeal embodiment outside of the
biomedical construction of pregnancy. If the woman chooses the former, “she becomes
the subject of a series of needs—for counseling, prenatal testing, diagnosis, prognosis,
and management.” 73
If a woman does not eschew the series of powerful suggestions that stamp
her as the reproducer of a life, she cannot avoid patienthood under the
gynecologist, sharing with him the social responsibility for the future of
the life within her, including the decision about whether to remain its
uterine environment or not. Once she consents to cooperate in prenatal
testing and the biotechnological care and management of her insides, she
is caught in a series of unavoidable “decisions” that lead from
amniocentesis to the interiorization of eugenics to the scientifically guided
care of a modern infant.
But a woman can refuse to accept this state and put herself outside the
framework that imposes such needs. Inevitably, she then exposes herself
to a series of criticisms. Some will see her as a “primitive” who deprives
herself and her infant of the benefits of modern medicine. Others will see
in her the romantic who places good will, emotions, and irresponsible trust
above the certainties of a modern institutionalized reality. And others will
dismiss her as utopian. 74
¶50

Yet, the poor, uninsured patient at Alpha Hospital does not have the option of
rejecting a scientific, technological model of pregnancy and putting herself “outside the
framework that imposes such needs.” She does not have the luxury of being viewed as a
romantic or being dismissed as a utopian. She cannot even elect the title of “primitive.”
Insofar as no options outside of an intensely medically-managed pregnancy exist for poor
women accepting Medicaid, they are forcibly conscripted into the regime of
biomedically-produced-and-satisfied needs. 75 I do not read Duden as arguing in favor of
73

DUDEN, supra note 8, at 54.
Id.
75
It is important to note that, if given the choice, many poor women would elect to have a medicallymanaged pregnancy. I have talked to many Alpha Hospital patients who are enthusiastic in expressing their
happiness with the care that they receive from the obstetrics clinic. Indeed, many women choose to receive
their care from Alpha Hospital—as opposed to hospitals that are located closer to their residences—
because they have heard that Alpha offers the “best” [read: most technologically-intense and scientificallyadvanced] prenatal care.
This is in line with anthropologist Gertrude Fraser’s study of obstetric and midwifery practices in
the South. Gertrude J. Fraser, Modern Bodies, Modern Minds: Midwifery and Reproductive Change in an
African American Community, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
REPRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 42, 57. Her study can be read as a response to Davis-Floyd’s work—
which may be accused of promoting natural childbirth as the “good” or “right” childbirth experience.
Fraser’s work cautions that race complicates the narrative told by those scholars who conceptualize
midwifery and natural childbirth as unitarily desired and desirable and medically-managed pregnancy and
childbirth as unitarily undesired and undesirable. Id. at 55. Fraser shows that in the impoverished,
74
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women foregoing medical treatment entirely—and neither would I suggest it. Rather, I
read Duden as acknowledging that a continuum of prenatal care exists: one may
conceptualize the woman who refuses all manner of prenatal care on one end of the
spectrum. On the other end, sits the woman who is the incubator for a fetus whose needs
are satisfied only by the most relentless medical science. Medicaid recipients are forced
to sit with the latter or forego prenatal care altogether. I understand such circumscribed
choice as hardly a choice at all.
¶51
Moreover, I am reminded of a woman, Summer, who was pregnant with her first
child when I met her. I was sitting behind the front desk when she approached me and
explained that she had just returned from an extended trip to visit her family in Israel. She
said that she had gone to the doctor while in Israel and he had given her and her fetus a
number of tests. She asked if she would have to repeat those tests at Alpha Hospital. I
responded, “Probably. Alpha likes to do all the tests themselves.” Later on, while she
waited for the midwife to call her, I asked if she wanted to be interviewed more formally
for my research. During the interview that followed, I learned that she was one of many
women who preferred prenatal care far away from the extreme end of the medicalization
continuum at which Medicaid recipients are necessarily situated:
Summer: Here it is different because in America, they are so fanatic. So,
here you have to do all the tests. So, I kind of go with it. If I was in
Israel, I wouldn’t know if it was a boy or girl. I would just go into labor
and that is it. Here it is impossible. That is why I told you in the
beginning that I did some tests in Israel and didn’t want to do it again. I
am probably going to have to do everything again.

predominately African-American community in which she did her fieldwork, medically-managed
pregnancies and childbirths were considered highly desirable. Id. This was a community that, due to
classism and racism, had largely been ignored by the medical establishment. That the women in this
community now had the choice of receiving their prenatal care from obstetricians and delivering their
babies in hospitals with the aid of anesthesia “signaled a symbolic if not fully realized inclusion in the field
of vision of a health-care bureaucracy that had until then largely ignored the health needs of African
Americans.” Id. at 57. Fraser notes that present-day critiques of medicalized pregnancies and childbirths,
and the simultaneous lauding of midwifery and natural childbirths, have “emerged with the growth of a
consumerist, choice-oriented social movement influenced in large part by middle-class (white) feminist
theory and praxis.” Id. at 55 (referencing Margaret Nelson, Birth and Social Class, in THE AMERICAN
WAY OF BIRTH (Pamela Eakins ed., 1986)). Poor women of color—who previously have been excluded
from both obstetrical practice and the generation of the feminist critique of that practice—might disagree
with the problematization of the biomedical paradigm of pregnancy and childbirth and, indeed, want
pregnancies administered in line with it. See also Davis-Floyd, supra note 62, at 1137 (noting that many
women feel empowered by technocratic births); Ellen S. Lazarus, Falling Through the Cracks:
Contradictions and Barriers to Care in a Prenatal Clinic,” 12 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY 269, 271, 280 (1990)
(noting that the poor, Puerto Rican women she interviewed, without regard to whether they were born on
the island or on the mainland, accepted the biomedical model of pregnancy as a pathological condition, and
consequently, wanted prenatal care that was delivered in line with it); Ellen S. Lazarus, Poor Women, Poor
Outcomes: Social Class and Reproductive Health, in CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 48 (Karen Michaelson ed., 1988) (noting that all the women who participated in her study
wanted their births to be medicalized procedures, as they ascribed to a view of pregnancy and birth as
possessing inherent biological risks).
I, nevertheless, view the forcible conscription of poor women’s bodies into the biomedical paradigm
of pregnancy as unjust because of the element of choice: Non-poor women with private health insurance
may elect this construction and administration of their bodies, while non-poor women with state-subsidized
health insurance may not so elect.
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Khiara: So, in Israel, your doctor has a different approach?
Summer: It is very alternative. You can do whatever you want. You can
refuse. I went to the doctor, but the only thing I did was give blood and
[listen to the fetal] heart[beat]. No sugar test or ultrasound. She told me if
I wanted to do it, I can, but, it is not mandatory.
Khiara: You feel that they compelled you to do the ultrasound here?
Summer: Yeah. Otherwise, I wouldn’t have done it.
Khiara: So, I know that every time you come, you have to do the urine
testing. . . .
Summer: Yeah. But, I wouldn’t do that if I didn’t have to.
Khiara: Then, why don’t you refuse?
Summer: To me it is not a choice. . . .
Khiara: I think that when you have a problem in your pregnancy, it is great
that you have all these things—all these tests and scans. But, when you
don’t have a problem, it is—
Summer: —unnecessary. But what can we do? I guess saying nothing is
better than having somebody come to see your house and all that kind of
stuff. I am just going to keep my mouth shut for now. 76
¶52

Interestingly, Summer understood the difference between the more “alternative”
approach to prenatal care that she enjoyed in Israel and the highly-medicalized approach
that she endured at Alpha in terms of the hospital’s “American”-ness. She did not realize
that the absence of choice—that is, her inability to opt for an “alternative” approach to
prenatal care—is a burden only poor women are forced to bear. Also noteworthy, she
believed that the price to pay for arguing against the medicalization of her pregnancy and
refusing to submit to the myriad tests that were prescribed for her was state scrutiny and
possibly regulation—“having somebody come to see your house and all that kind of
stuff.” Concluding that such a price was too high, she opted to submit to the
medicalization of her pregnancy and “keep [her] mouth shut for now.”
¶53
Moreover, insofar as the model of prenatal care enacted at and by Alpha Hospital—
which is administered pursuant to Medicaid guidelines—is one premised on surveillance
of a body that is always capable of failing at a moment’s notice, one may argue that the
foundation of this prenatal regime is the unruly body. The construction of the pregnant
body as an unruly body occurs whenever it is intensively medically-managed;
consequently, the pregnant bodies of the non-poor may be thus constructed and treated.
76

Interview with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (Feb. 2007).
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This is to say that the unruly pregnant body is not specific to the uninsured poor; rather it
is characteristic of the body of any pregnant woman who elects (insofar as any woman,
living within a society in which the medicalization of pregnancy is the norm, can
conceive of their being any choice at all) to be treated within and subjected by the
standard, biomedical paradigm. But, as discussed above, therein lies the fundamental
difference between the unruly bodies of the poor and the non-poor: the non-poor may
elect to have their bodies administered in such a fashion. To the extent that Medicaid
coverage of prenatal expenses is concomitant with a pregnancy administered squarely
within the biomedical paradigm, then poor, uninsured women do not choose in any sense
to have their bodies constructed as unruly. It is a construction that is foisted upon them.
¶54
Furthermore, the unruly bodies constructed by Alpha rarely disappoint. That is,
anomalies, disorders, abnormalities, and malfunctions are regularly and relentlessly found
within the pregnant bodies of Alpha patients; yet many of these anomalies, disorders,
abnormalities, and malfunctions “resolve themselves” or otherwise have no effect on the
health of the fetus or the mother. For instance, on several occasions, I have translated
explanations by the ultrasound technicians to Spanish-speaking patients that placenta
previa 77 was detected during their sonograms; however, the ultrasound technicians always
assure the women that they should not worry because the placenta usually moves away
from the cervix over the course of the woman’s pregnancy. Thus, the potential issue is
resolved.
¶55
On these occasions, I imagine that the effect of a diagnosis of placenta previa
merely serves as a reminder to the woman that she occupies an unruly body that may fail
at any given moment; she is thereby warned that her submission to the biomedical
paradigm and the physicians that perform it is required if she hopes for the health of her
baby. 78 That patients are frequently diagnosed with conditions that proceed to no effect
might be explained as a failure of a medical technology that “sees too much.” Or, it
might just be the effect of screens, tests, and examinations that speak in terms of
probability, risk, and likelihood: all patients are rendered at risk for something—even if
that risk is one in one million.

77
Placenta previa is a condition in which the placenta partially or completely covers the cervical os.
Patients with placenta previa are advised to undergo a Caesarian section, as they are at risk for massive
hemorrhaging if the placenta covers the cervix when the latter begins to dilate in preparation for the birth of
the baby. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Bleeding during Pregnancy,
http://www.acog.org/publications/patient_education/bp038.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
78
There are countless anecdotes that I could recount concerning the plethora of diagnoses made by Alpha
providers that served little purpose beyond reiterating the fact of patients’ unruly bodies. I will offer only
one more: I remember having a long conversation and/or in-depth interview with one delightful patient
while she waited over two hours for an ultrasound scan. After she was finally called and had completed her
scan, I asked one of the nurses if the patient had left for home yet, as I wanted to exchange contact
information with her. The nurse replied, “No; she’s talking to a doctor. They saw something with the
baby’s heart in the ultrasound.” I became distraught, imagining the patient’s own distress at receiving news
of a problem with her fetus. In response, the nurse said, “No, no, no. Don’t worry. It’s no big deal. They
see this all the time. It usually goes away.” I looked at her skeptically. She laughed at my continued
distress and said, “It’s nothing to worry about. Really. It usually goes away.” Indeed, when I talked to the
patient after her meeting with the doctor, she said, “They want to run some sort of blood test. If it comes
back negative, then there really is nothing there. But, if it comes back positive, then they would just have
to monitor me to make sure that the heart thing goes away.” Again: such an anxiety-producing diagnosis
for a “heart thing” that would go away with or without a medical intervention probably did little more than
to produce anxiety (in her and me) and reiterate the unruliness of this patient’s body.
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¶56

It should be noted that Alpha Hospital offers women the choice of receiving their
prenatal care from midwives. In spite of this, this choice does not usually offer women
an exit from a medically-managed pregnancy and consequent construction of their bodies
as unruly ones.
¶57
First, many women do not know that the choice among the physician, the nurse
practitioner, and the midwife exists. On the day of the PCAP appointment, after meeting
with the host of staff members discussed above and completing all the urine and blood
tests requested of them, women are given an appointment to return to the clinic and have
a medical examination. This appointment—ironically called a “doctor’s appointment” by
Alpha staff—is the woman’s first meeting with the physician, nurse practitioner, or
midwife. Whether the woman is assigned to a physician, nurse practitioner, or midwife is
a matter of chance; the woman receives the next available appointment in the schedule.
If the next available appointment is with the midwife, the patient is so assigned and will
continue to be seen by the midwife for the duration of her pregnancy (unless a medical
problem is later detected and she is transferred to the High Risk Clinic to be attended by a
physician). Few patients know that there exist three categories of providers in the
obstetrics clinic at Alpha Hospital. 79 Further, if patients are aware of the three varieties
of care, few of them know that they can request one of the three. 80 And further still, of
the small group of patients who know that they can make a choice among a physician,
nurse practitioner, and midwife, very few of these know the differences in the manner of
care offered by midwives versus physicians or nurse practitioners. That is, very few
appreciate that midwives ascribe to a paradigm within which the pregnant body is not
constructed as unruly.
¶58
Second, and crucially, women who choose to receive their prenatal care from
midwives still undergo a medically-managed pregnancy because the care provided by
midwives at Alpha Hospital is not qualitatively different from the care provided by
physicians and nurse practitioners. This similarity in care is due to the fact that the
midwives, like the other categories of providers at Alpha, must comply with the Medicaid
protocol for PCAP providers. Undeniably, many patients who have had experiences with
both the midwives and physicians appreciate that the midwives take a different approach
to women’s healthcare. The patients with whom I have spoken frequently describe their
midwives as “nice”; they say that the midwives “take their time” during their meetings
with the patients; many patients say that the midwives ask more questions and try to get
them to talk more about their pregnancies. 81 This is to be contrasted with patient
79
In fact, when I ask women with whom I conduct in-depth interviews if they are seen by a doctor, nurse
practitioner, or midwife, I am usually met with bewildered expressions and/or attestations of “I have no
idea.” To clarify, I am not arguing that these Alpha patients are somehow irresponsible for not having
discovered the training and qualifications of the providers of their prenatal care; instead, I am emphasizing
that many Alpha patients have not been given enough information to know that the discovery of the
training and qualifications of their providers is a relevant inquiry.
80
It would appear that even the Alpha employees are surprised when they are approached by a patient who
requests a certain quality of provider. Natalie, a former eleventh grade English teacher who was pregnant
with her second child when I met her, told me that during her initial PCAP visit, she requested a midwife as
her prenatal care provider. She says, “I remember [the nurse] telling me, ‘Well, you’re lucky that you
ended up here, because we have a midwife program and you’re interested in that.’ And I’m like, ‘I’m not
lucky. I picked it.’ [Laughs.] . . . ‘This is why I came here. ‘Cause that’s what I wanted.’” Interview with
anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (Jan. 2007).
81
One patient’s midwifery encounter exemplifies many of the stories women have shared with me about
their experiences with the Alpha Hospital midwives: Before this patient had her first official meeting with,
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encounters with physicians, who are described as “rushed” and “fast,” or alternatively,
“unremarkable.” 82 Nevertheless, patients who are seen by the midwives must submit
urine to be tested at every visit. They must endure the “glucose challenge test,” the triple
screening for gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis, and HIV, and all required vaccinations.
Their fetuses are screened for genetic abnormalities when clinically indicated. Their
bodies are constantly weighed, blood pressures systematically checked, and interiors
regularly made visible via ultrasound and vaginal examinations. This program of
prenatal care is mandated by Medicaid. So, essentially, the unorthodoxy, or “alternativeness,” of any midwifery practice reimbursed by Medicaid—without regard to whether the
midwife practices within a public hospital or outside of one—is severely constrained by
the necessity of delivering care in accordance with the dictates of being a Medicaid
“PCAP provider.” 83
¶59
The result is that poor, uninsured women in the state of New York are compelled to
live unruly bodies and the medically-managed pregnancies that are their cause and effect.
This is significant because in the absence of a choice of a low-intervention prenatal care
and examination by, the midwife, she had been informed that the midwife whom she would be seeing that
day was male. She was wary of receiving her examination from a male and told me that she would
probably switch to a female physician for her subsequent visits. At her next appointment, I saw her in the
waiting room and asked how her visit with the midwife had been. She said, “He is so amazing! I love him.
I went in there [the exam room] and told him that I was worried about the baby because I’m not showing
that much. And I wanted to know if he thought that I was too small. And he says, ‘You’re just falling in
love. And you’re going to be doing this over the next thirty years. And you’re just going to have to let go
and stop worrying and enjoy the experience.’ It was so unexpected! I totally didn’t expect him to say
that—to respond to my question in that way! I loved it.” Indeed, patients often describe the midwives in
much kinder terms than they do the midwives’ counterparts with medical degrees.
82
The adjective that is most frequently proffered by patients describing their physicians is “fine”—as in:
“How do you like your doctor?” “She’s fine.” Or, “How was your visit with the doctor?” “It was fine.”
83
One profound difference between the midwifery practice and that of the physicians and nurse
practitioners is that only the midwives’ patients can deliver in the birthing center at Alpha Hospital.
Meanwhile, the patients of the physicians and nurse practitioners must deliver in the standard labor and
delivery rooms. In the latter, patients must remain in a hospital bed, connected to an IV and external fetal
monitor. Only two persons, both over the age of 18, are allowed to join the laboring woman in the delivery
room. Once the woman delivers, she and her newborn are transferred to a different postpartum room where
they remain until they are discharged from the hospital.
In contrast, a patient who delivers in the birthing center is not confined to the bed. Because she has
neither an IV nor fetal monitor, she may move freely within the room—which is equipped with a kitchen,
Jacuzzi tub, large screen television, private bathroom, and expansive views of the East River. Moreover,
there are no limitations on the number of persons (and the ages of those persons) who may join her in the
birthing room while she is in labor. Finally, the woman may remain in the same birthing center room until
she is discharged from the hospital. If, on the other hand, a woman desires an epidural, or if a C-section
becomes clinically indicated, the patient must deliver in the standard labor and delivery rooms.
I should also note that when there is actually a choice between proceeding within the biomedical
paradigm of pregnancy, labor, and delivery, and an alternative one, midwives choose the latter. One
pregnant patient gave me an account of the birth of her son, whom she had delivered at Alpha. She says
that the umbilical cord was wrapped around her son’s neck for much of the last trimester of pregnancy.
However, instead of undergoing a C-section, her midwife heeded her wishes and attempted a vaginal
delivery. Once her son’s head was delivered, the midwife removed the umbilical cord from his neck. The
rest of the delivery proceeded without incident. The patient said, “The only reason why I was able to avoid
a C-section was because of the midwife; if I had had a doctor, they would have done the C-section. No
questions asked.” Interview with anonymous obstetrics clinic patient (Jan. 2007).
This is an assessment with which I wholly agree. (In fact, I believe that most midwives would have
advised this patient to undergo a C-section.) This patient’s experience demonstrates that the Alpha
midwives may elect to perform fewer medical interventions than the physicians and the nurse practitioners.
But, again, this offer is only available when the midwives have a choice to do so; and, for the majority of
patients’ pregnancies, the midwives have no such choice.
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program, Medicaid—and the state that administers it—enacts the poor, pregnant body as
one that can only and should only be treated medically, scientifically, and therapeutically.
Prenatal care within the Medicaid regime can be understood to proceed from the
assumption that the errors and risks within the poor, pregnant body (which are invariably
“there” and must be detected via constant screens and tests) can only be remedied by
medical science. The poor body, then, is one that is exposed to bacteria and viruses;
hence, antibiotics, antiviral medications, and vaccinations are administered. The poor
body is one that is malnourished; hence, WIC, and the concomitant prescription of
prenatal vitamins and recommended consumption of meat and dairy, are provided. The
poor body is one whose reproduction is dangerously unrestrained and, yes, unruly; hence,
the parade of contraceptives placed in front of the post-partum body 84 —ranging from the
lower-intervention condoms to the intensely high-intervention Depo-Provera injection. 85
¶60
The consequence, I believe, is a medicalization of poverty. Poverty is treated as a
condition that produces ailments and disorders all rectifiable, or at least managed,
through the application of medical science. In this way, the poor are treated as biological
dangers—to themselves, to their fetuses, and to the society within which they exist.
¶61
Indeed, Medicaid’s profoundly medicalized management of pregnancy, and the
simultaneous production of poor, pregnant women as biological dangers, might be
understood as an admission by the state of the unjust nature of capitalism and the class
structure that is its sine qua non. Essentially, the state assumes that the poor, pregnant
body that presents itself to the obstetrics clinic is one that has not had the benefit of
regular (or, even irregular) medical check-ups—an assumption that is especially true for
the “undocumented” pregnant bodies that present themselves at Alpha. The battery of
tests to which patients must submit themselves might be understood as a corrective to the
years of medical inattention that poverty and the absence of health insurance compel.
The function of every organ and every system is assessed because class inequality
dictates that their health would not have been established previously via periodic
evaluations—a comfort that the insured enjoy. Indeed, it is not entirely unreasonable to
assume that an aggressive medical gaze is appropriate for the uninsured. These are
women who do not have the benefit of annual Pap smears to detect abnormal cervical cell
84
The matter of encouraging Alpha patients to select a method of contraception is complex. On the one
hand, providing information about contraceptives and the actual devices to Alpha patients is valuable
insofar as some of the women may, indeed, desire the service. On the other hand, for those women who
happily greeted their present pregnancy and will happily greet the next, the parade of contraceptives
retrospectively demeans the pregnancy and birth itself, by implication; the abundant message that is
communicated is that such an event should be prohibited from being repeated.
85
Expectedly, the Depo-Provera injection (which consists of a high dose of progesterone, thereby
preventing the woman from ovulating for three months at a time) is the birth control method that comes
most highly-recommended by Alpha providers and staff. See Sheldon Segal, Contraceptive Update, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457, 461 (1997) (“Depo-Provera, an injection of the progestogen
medroxy-progesterone acetate that lasts for three months, finally was approved for use as a contraceptive in
the United States in 1992, after having been used in over ninety other countries for decades.”). It should be
noted, though, that there is dissension within the Alpha obstetrics clinic concerning how soon after giving
birth women should be offered the Depo-Provera injection: The obstetrician that heads the Labor and
Delivery ward [L&D] has created a policy whereby women are asked whether they would like to receive
the Depo-Provera injection before they are discharged from the hospital—that is, within three days after
giving birth. The breastfeeding educator informed me that she, along with another nurse in L&D, is
lobbying to change the policy. Their objection to it is that they believe that the high dose of
medroxyprogesterone acetate in the injection may decrease the woman’s ability to produce a sufficient
amount of breast milk for her newborn.
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growth. These are women who do not have the luxury of having a urinary tract infection
diagnosed before it becomes asymptomatic and manifests itself as kidney malfunction.
These are the women who do not have the advantage of being told if that lump in the
breast really is nothing to worry about.
¶62
All of this is to say that Medicaid’s tenacious management of pregnancy performs a
confession: it confesses that capitalism and the poverty that is its effect create a state of
affairs inside of which common and curable ailments within the poor body go undetected.
The insistent medical manipulation of the pregnant body mandated by Medicaid can be
understood as an attempt to rectify that situation; however, within that attempt is an
implicit acknowledgement of the unjust nature of the class structure of this capitalist
society.
V.

CONCLUSION

¶63

In conclusion, it should be noted that many of the poor women that I have
encountered do not passively accept state regulation of their bodies, nor do they
submissively accept conscription into a biomedical model of pregnancy and the
concurrent construction of their bodies as unruly. I am constantly made aware of discrete
acts of resistance. Such acts may be as minor as a woman lying to the nutritionist about
the frequency of her cheese consumption—as did a clever patient, who simply wanted to
avoid being “hassled” about her vegan diet and shorten the length of her requisite session
with the nutritionist. 86 Other acts of resistance are bolder, as when a patient refuses to
answer the inquiries of the social worker, or avoids meeting with the social worker
altogether by ignoring her when she calls out the patient’s name in the waiting room.
Additionally, a patient’s refusal to be seen by a resident obstetrician and her demand of
care from an attending might be interpreted as a bold act of resistance. This patient’s
mother, who had prompted the patient to insist upon an attending physician as her
provider, told me, “I said to her [the patient, her daughter], ‘You’re not a guinea pig.’ I
know this is a teaching hospital; but, they need to find someone else to learn on.” Indeed,
the very selection of Alpha Hospital (in lieu of another as the site of prenatal care) should
be understood as an act of resistance for many women who do not blindly go to the
nearest public hospital, but instead travel far to Alpha because they believe that it has an
excellent reputation.
¶64
Conceivably, some of the myriad medical problems with which Alpha patients are
diagnosed—ranging from gestational diabetes, to excessive weight gain, to placenta
previa—might also be understood as discrete acts of resistance. As medical
anthropologists Lock and Scheper-Hughes argued some time ago: “The medical gaze is,
then, a controlling gaze, through which active (although furtive) forms of protest are
transformed into passive acts of ‘breakdown.’” 87
86
Analogous to the way that I see resistance in (some would say) minor acts of Alpha obstetrics patients,
historian/anthropologist Robin D. G. Kelley similarly describes behavior of some employees who worked
in a McDonald’s restaurant in which he did field research. Following James C. Scott’s notion of “hidden
transcripts,” Kelley argues that the employees’ “infrapolitical tactics” included wearing their McDonald’s
baseball caps to the side, turning the music that played over the speakers in the store from easy-listening to
Rick James, and extending fifteen-minute breaks by another fifteen minutes. ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE
REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS, 8-10 (1994).
87
Margaret Lock & Nancy Scheper-Hughes, A Critical Interpretive Approach in Medical Anthropology:
Rituals and Routines of Discipline and Dissent, in MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY THEORY
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In fact, I would like to imagine the very act of being pregnant as an act of resistance
for many of the poor, expectant mothers who are served in the obstetrics clinic at Alpha
Hospital. I am always moved whenever I see in the waiting room a pregnant nanny with
her White charge. I think of Ginsberg and Rapp’s formulation of “stratified
reproduction”—a term used to “describe the power relations by which some categories of
people are empowered to nurture and reproduce, while others are disempowered.” 88
Ginsburg and Rapp explain:
Low-income African American mothers . . . are stereotyped as
undisciplined ‘breeders’ who sap the resources of the state through
incessant demands on welfare. But historically and in the present, they
were good enough nurturers to work as childcare providers for other, more
privileged class and ethnic groups. . . . The concept of stratified
reproduction helps us see the arrangements by which some reproductive
futures are valued while others are despised.89

¶66

Accordingly, I see resistance whenever I see in the waiting area pregnant women of
color employed as nannies, who not only value their own reproductive futures, but insist
upon them—even while enacting an employment that recognizes their ability to nurture
other women’s children and simultaneously disregards or demeans their competency to
nurture their own.
¶67
Indeed, resistance might be seen in the fact of many other of these poor women’s
pregnant bodies. That is, in the face of the discursive problematization of their fertility,
despite polemical attestations that their reliance on governmental aid is “un-American”
and figures them outside of the deserving body politic, notwithstanding that mythical and
fantastical ideas of their children exist in the national imagination as the future scourges
of society, the patients at Alpha Hospital embrace their fertility and have and love their
babies. This, I believe, can be a powerful, material act of resistance.

AND METHOD 68

(Carolyn F. Sargent & Thomas M. Johnson eds. 1996).
Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp, Introduction to CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
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